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Recent public opinion data has revealed that satisfaction with democracy as a government 
system is in decline globally. An observed surge in support of anti-establishment movements is 
also recognized. The escalation of these groups has intensified partisan polarization and 
populism which decrease the effectiveness of democratic institutions and trust in government. 
Many scholars attribute this modern decline in democracy to a variety of social, political, 
economic, and contextual factors. The goal of this thesis is to join the conversation of why 
democracy is in decline by focusing on research from an economic perspective. The purpose of 
this research is to explore the relationship the economy has to democracy and provide evidence 
to support the proposed theory that economic stability is critical to democracy 
The methodology used to examine these topics includes a quantitative data analysis in a 
case study manner. The United States and Britain serve as countries for these case studies due to 
their dominance as democratic capitalistic nations. The research questions associated to this 
assessment investigate how recession influences political polarization, how party realignment 
alters public opinion, and how manufacturing production shifts impact populism. The data 
examined when answering these questions reveals decreases in reports of economic satisfaction, 
well-being, and confidence in government due to recession in chapter one. Chapter two’s 
discussion of realignment of the Labour Party in Britain indicates that public opinion of political 
satisfaction decreased while the importance relating to international partnerships and 
immigration increased among citizens. Chapter three found that economic insecurity caused by 
displacing local manufacturing jobs produces a nationalist political backlash. 
iii 
 
The findings of these chapters serve as evidence to support the claims that recession 
increases political polarization, realignment of the Labour Party in Britain decreased public 
opinion, and manufacturing production shifts increased populism. These conclusions indicate 
that current international integrative efforts have expanded the consequences of long-standing 
economic policies of previous decades which were then exacerbated by the Great Recession. The 
significance of this study is its use of these findings to illustrate how neoliberalism, 
globalization, and recession have destabilized economies. Modern political instability then 
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The traditional concepts of democracy are being challenged all over the world in 
modern times. Democracy is defined as a government where people are represented by 
officials in a free electoral system. Democracies have deteriorated in nearly every region 
of the globe where citizens no longer feel they are properly represented which has created 
protests and popular mobilization. The fragility of institutions in nations which were once 
viewed as the epitome of democratic stability has become visible.1 
1.2 Theory and Methodology 
 
This thesis applies the knowledge from existing literature to a data analysis of 
public opinion to provide insight on the connection neoliberalism, globalization, and 
recession have to the modern decrease in satisfaction of democracy. A case study 
methodology using the United States and The United Kingdom in a comparative manner 
can reach findings which will apply to this scholarly conversation in a broader context 
than a nation specific assessment. Comparing timeframes of before and after recession 
can also reveal patterns which illustrate why current economic crises exacerbate 
longstanding inequalities. Case studies conducted in this manner can establish the 
relationship the economy has to democracy to then prove the proposed theory that 
economic stability is critical to democracy. 
                                                            
1 David Miliband. "Brexit, Populism, and the Future of British Democracy." Horizons: Journal of 





1.3.1 Decline in Democracy 
 
The deterioration of modern democracy can be first illustrated in the numerical 
decline of democratic countries, the numerical increase of autocratic nations, the 
widespread decline of favorability, and the decline of satisfaction views of democracy. 
The consequences of this decline of public opinion can then explained through the 
monetary and political costs associated to anti-establishment movements from a global 
perspective. 
The decline associated to democracy has been observed for over a decade but new 
research suggests that an autocratization wave is occurring. Democratic countries have 
decreased as the number of autocratic countries has increased since 1994.2  In 2017, the 
number of autocratizing countries exceeded the number of democratizing countries for 
the first time since 1940. Figure 1.1 illustrates the decline of democratizing countries 







                                                            
2Seraphine F. Maerz, Anna Lührmann, Sebastian Hellmeier, Sandra Grahn and  Staffan I. Lindberg. ‘State 













  “State of the World 2019: Autocratization Surges – Resistance Grows”3 
 
The charts indicate a clear trend of decline in the number democratizing countries 
and their percentage share of the world population. There is a pattern of decrease in these 
numbers both in 2000 and 2010. The information conveyed in this chart confirms 
increasing confidence in autocracy in contrast to democracy. In June 2019, the Financial 
                                                            
3Maerz, Lührmann, Hellmeier, Grahn and  Lindberg. ‘State of the World 2019: Autocratization Surges – 




Times quoted Vladimir Putin himself stating, “the liberal idea is obsolete and has 
outlived its purpose.”4 
The favorability of democracy is also dropping across many democratic countries. 
These nations include Australia, Britain, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Sweden.5 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the percentage of people who say it is “essential” to live in a 
democracy ranging from the 1930s to the 1980s. 
Figure 1.2. 







    “The Signs of Deconsolidation” By the Journal of Democracy6 
All countries listed in the graphic display the decline of at least 20% in those who 
found strong importance of living in a democracy after 1930. In the cases of The United 
                                                            
4Ibid. 
5 Roberto Stefan Foa, and Yascha Mounk. “The Signs of Deconsolidation.” Journal of Democracy 28, no. 1 
(2017): 6. 





States and Britain, the decrease in the last 50 years was nearly 50%. These numbers can 
be further expanded on by Figure 1.3 which conveys global reports of satisfaction with 
democracy ranging from 1995 to 2020. 
Figure 1.3. 









“The Global Satisfaction with Democracy Report 2020” by The Centre for the Future of Democracy7 
The graph reveals generally consistent reports of under 25% dissatisfied until 
roughly 2008. After 2008, a substantial increase is indicated in the reports of 
dissatisfaction regarding democracy from a global perspective. The reports of 50 % 
dissatisfied with democracy are nearly double of the numbers reported before 2008. The 
                                                            
7Foa, R.S., Klassen, A., Slade, M., Rand, A. and R. Collins. “The Global Satisfaction with Democracy Report 2020.” 
Centre for the Future of Democracy (2020): 18. 
Fig. 1.3. 3 
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decline of satisfaction is evident, but raises the question, what specifically is occurring 
that is causing the decline? Incorporating important global events into these 
measurements of dissatisfaction can provide the answer. 
Figure 1.4 provides a similar measurement assessment to Figure 1.3 regarding 
dissatisfaction of democracy. However, the figure expands on the percentages by 




























“The Global Satisfaction with Democracy Report 2020” by The Centre for the Future of Democracy8 
 
The global events included in the graphic highlight the early 2000s recession, 
European Union enlargement, the start of the global financial crises, bail out conflicts, 
and important political elections. All of the events coincided with spikes in the responses 
of dissatisfaction and continued a general trend of dissatisfaction.  
                                                            
8 Foa, R.S., Klassen, A., Slade, M., Rand, A. and R. Collins. “The Global Satisfaction with Democracy 
Report 2020.” Centre for the Future of Democracy (2020): 9. 
 
Fig. 1.4.  4 
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The decline of democracy is clear though the visible decreases in measurements 
of the number, the favorability, and the satisfaction in this governmental system. The 
modern conversation of declining democracy is relevant and important because of the 
political responses and economic consequences which have coincided with it. These 
responses include increased electoral support of anti-establishment movements, increased 
political polarization, and increased populism. The economic consequences can be 
illustrated by gridlock in Congress in the United States and the results of the Referendum 
for Britain to leave the European Union. 
1.3.2 Anti-Establishment Movements 
 
Measured support for anti establishment movements have increased in an 
abundance of countries. Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front in France united with a 
platform together against the EU as a political establishment. In addition, Umberto 
Bossi’s Lega Nord in Italy, Jorg Haider’s Freedom Party in Austria, the Vlaams Belang 
in Belgium, and the Sweden Democrats Party have all acquired approximately 10 percent 
of the vote in their last national parliamentary elections. These anti-system movements do 
not only position themselves with the people against elites, but do so by challenging the 
principles of representative democracy.9 These movements give a voice to the anger and 
frustration of citizens and embody what many consider to be viable alternative to 
democracy. General feelings of distrust, economic malaise, and political instability have 
given birth to new anti-establishment movements or have strengthened existing ones. 
These movements are the articulations of modern increases in populism. 
                                                            
9 Dokos, Thanos, Eleonora Poli, Chiara Rosselli, Eduard Soler I Lecha, and Nathalie Tocci. “The Eurozone 





  Populism originates as a political source when existing political parties are not 
responding to the desires of large sections of the electorate. This condition is referred to 
by scholars as a representation gap. The 2016 election of Donald Trump as President of 
the United States has been defined as quintessentially populist and is related to party 
politics10. His supporters have a strong nationalist identity and researchers suggest his 
presidency may be the result of the Republican Party's failure to incorporate a wide range 
of constituencies. Populism allows the problems of individuals to become grievances of a 
“people like us” collective.11 
 The increases in number and electoral support of these movements illustrate the 
rise of populism globally. These increases are alarming by the threat they pose to 
democracy.12 Indeed, an integral component required to sustain democracy is mutual 
tolerance of politicians according to Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, the Harvard 
University authors of How Democracies Die. Government actors must accept their 
opponents as legitimate representatives and loyal citizens with which they disagree. 
Civility cannot be achieved if opponents are viewed as dangerous and illegitimate.13 
Therefore, an additional component of emerging populism as it pertains to the extensive 
divide among representatives is political polarization. 
                                                            
10 Eric J. Oliver, and Wendy M. Rahm "Rise of the "Trumpenvolk": Populism in the 2016 Election." The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 667 (2016): 202. 
11 Oliver, and Rahm "Rise of the "Trumpenvolk,” 203. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt. How Democracies Die (New York: Crown Publishing (2018) 153. 
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1.3.4 Political Polarization 
Populism is detrimental to democracy because it fuels political polarization. 
Political polarization weakens a democracy’s ability to function effectively. Populists 
force extreme and exclusionary efforts into political agendas. Public discourse is 
effectively pushed out to the ends of the political spectrum which undermines the 
consensus building political culture which democracy requires. Populists also view the 
world from a divisive perspective which places people in contrast against corrupt elites. 
Politics are framed as a zero sum competition between these groups14. The consequence 
of populist parties entering government is that public attitudes polarize. People become 
willing to tolerate abuses of power and sacrifice orderly and regulated democratic 
principles. The end justifies the means if the interests of their side are advanced and the 
other is kept out of power. Therefore, populism fueled political polarization increases the 
risk of democratic decline.15 
Populism and political polarization have clear associations to the decline of 
modern democracy. However, more clarity on this connection can be illustrated by asking 
the question: what are the specific visible costs associated to political polarization and 
populism? Insight can be gathered by reviewing polarization in Congress in the United 
States and the Referendum Vote in Britain to leave the European Union. 
1.3.5 The Costs 
 
                                                            
14Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Carisa Nietsche. “Combating Populism: A Toolkit for Liberal Democratic 
Actors. “ Center for a New American Security(2020): 3. 




The costs of political polarization in Congress can be illustrated by examining the 
information in Figure 1.5. Figure 1.5 measures the average difference on a party conflict 
scale to highlight polarization in Congress and ranges from 1878 to 2006.  
Figure 1.5. 
 








  “Causes and Consequences of Polarization.” By Cambridge University Press and 
DW-NOMINATE measures16 
 
The chart reveals an increase in the average difference on party conflict scale over 
the last 50 years. The largest trends also appear to begin in the 1970s as there are 
                                                            
16 Michael J. Barber, and Nolan McCarty. “Causes and Consequences of Polarization.” In Solutions to 





significantly lacking decreases in these polarization measurements. Additionally, both 
polarization in the House and Senate are the highest they have ever been since 1878. 
Political polarization is claimed to damage government institutions by producing 
policy gridlock and ineffectiveness. For example, researchers have noted that the 112th 
United States Congress passed fewer laws than any Congress stretching back to the 
1800s.17 Additionally, the filibuster is more regularly used as a partisan way to promote 
gridlock which obstructs legislation that serves public interest. Congress is also more 
likely to miss deadlines and continue legislation into future sessions.18 These concerns 
have been raised about congressional ability to manage longer-term problems such as 
reform to entitlements including Social Security and Medicare. It is important to also note 
that just 9 percent of Americans have a great confidence in Congress.19The movement 
away from the political center has coupled with bitter partisanship and voters became 
disillusioned with Washington politics.20 Costs associated to polarization in Congress can 
also be found in the consequences of the Referendum vote in the United Kingdom. 
Figure 1.6 conveys the results of the 2016 Referendum to leave the European 
Union. The illustration highlights the high level of polarization associated to the decision 
with 52% voting to leave and 48% voting to stay. This very close split represents extreme 
                                                            
17 Sarah A. Binder "The Disappearing Political Center: Congress and the Incredible Shrinking Middle." The 
Brookings Review 14, no. 4 (1996): 38. 
18 Binder "The Disappearing Political Center: Congress and the Incredible Shrinking Middle." 39. 
19 Niall Ferguson. "Populism as a Backlash against Globalization: Historical Perspectives." Horizons: 
Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development, no. 8 (2016): 12. 




disagreement in the nation and will likely be exacerbated when the costs associated to 
leaving are clearer. 
Figure 1.6. 
 










 ““’Brexit’ Opens Uncertain Chapter in Britain’s Storied History,”” from the New York Times,  
The BBC, and British Office of National Statistics21 
 
Author John Van Reenen argues that high trade costs with the rest of Europe will 
be inevitable with the vote to leave. Trade with Europe comprises almost half of all trade 
in Britain. Lower trade and investment will likely produce lower average incomes for UK 
                                                            
21 Steven Erlanger, “’Brexit’ Opens Uncertain Chapter in Britain’s Storied History,” The New York Times, 





citizens. Trade costs will emerge from a combination of tariff and non tariff barriers.22 
Computable multi country and multi sector equilibrium models suggest welfare losses of 
1.3% to 3.6%. Additional models which incorporate productivity effects claim that these 
numbers could be much higher and range from 6% to 9%. When the Referendum was 
held on June 23 2016, Britain’s Sterling Pound value dropped the same day of the 
announcement.23 
Those who argue in favor of leaving the European Union claim the benefits will 
ultimately outweigh the costs if lower immigration, improved regulations, and increased 
trade deals with other non-European nations are obtained. The vote to leave termed 
“Brexit” is unique regarding the costs. It reveals what policy issues are becoming more 
crucial to citizens even if there are costs associated to them and highlights the increased 
importance of international issues. 
The discord in Europe and the United states caused by Brexit and increasing 
political polarization has further diminished the appeal of democracy for people who used 
to see it as an unrivaled governmental model to imitate. Even in the success stories of 
Central and Eastern Europe, the initial enthusiasm for European integration has given 
way to growing support for illiberal and nativist policies.  Support for these policies stem 
from feelings of diminished sovereignty implicit in the very project of westernization. 
Around the world as social discourse becomes more polarized, nationalist polices gain 
traction with voters and citizens become less trusting of democratic institutions. This loss 
of legitimacy can be attributed to many factors which exist independently. However, in a 
                                                            
22 John Van Reenen. "Brexit’s Long-Run Effects on the U.K. Economy." Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, (2016): 366. 
23 Van Reenen. "Brexit’s Long-Run Effects on the U.K. Economy." 367. 
15 
 
broader sense, many scholars suggest these factors are intertwined and strengthen each 
other through globalization. Globalization then exacerbated problems associated to 
financial crisis and neoliberal policies. 
1.3.6 Globalization 
 
International integration present in the European Union is essentially a monetary 
partnership which establishes an economic system designed to foster competition among 
private sector players. However, these centralized policies ultimately removed currency 
devaluation of member states while the competitiveness of their economies remained 
uneven. Joint decision making in the partnership was lacking on financial, economic, and 
social policies which allowed for distributional mechanisms to strengthen existing 
structural imbalances between the economies of member nations.24 
Stricter monitoring and greater coordination of national economic interests aimed 
at larger unity became unpopular. These rules were perceived by large segments of 
society as ineffective and to have contributed to a further economic hardship resulting in 
a decline of national parliamentary sovereignty over budget making.25 European citizens 
began feeling the effects of weakening welfare systems, rising unemployment, and 
minimal growth. People viewed the economic partnership as progressively and 
systematically producing the inability for them to enjoy their economic, social, civic and 
political rights. Exclusion of many groups from the decision making process resulted in 
                                                            
24 Thanos Dokos, Eleonora Poli, Chiara Rosselli, Eduard Soler I Lecha, and Nathalie Tocci. “The Eurozone 
Crisis and Anti-Establishment Groups in Southern Europe .” Istituto Affari Internazionali (2013): 12. 
25 Dokos, Poli, Rosselli, Soler and Tocci. “The Eurozone Crisis and Anti-Establishment Groups in Southern 
Europe .” 13. 
16 
 
an increase of economic and social inequality.26 Widespread frustration with the EU and 
the alienation of elected elites from the people occurred. This alienation, therefore, has an 
economic origin which produced political consequences. 
The political developments of the 2016 electoral campaign in the United States 
and Brexit in Britain have revealed the depth of anxiety and resentment among citizens in 
many wealthy nations. These issues reach further than the economic environment and 
likely cannot be addressed by economic policy alone.27 However, the economy appears to 
have been key to the political upheaval through which people are now living. Solutions to 
these problems may no longer be enough to stabilize the political and social environment, 
but it difficult to imagine how to restore a sense of order without addressing the 
economic concerns.28 Thusly, the question can be asked: how does the economy 
influence satisfaction of democracy? The answer can be found by further examining the 
relationship the economy has to democracy which will allow one to join the conversation 
of the why there is modern dissatisfaction of democracy. 
The alienation of elected elites from the people, exclusion of many social groups 
from the decision making process of the state and society, and increasing social economic 
inequality have all decreased the satisfaction associated to democracy. The costs of 
political polarization and populism as represented in Congress and the Brexit vote have 
clear economic distinctions. When researching how the economy relates to democracy 
                                                            
26 Ibid. 
27 David Black. “Revitalizing Democracy Assistance to Counter Threats to Democratization.” The German 
Marshall Fund of the United States no. 26(2019): 5. 
28 Michael Piore. "Economic Policy in the Time of Reactionary Populism." Issues in Science and 
Technology 34, no. 3 (2018): 24. 
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The economic hardship associated to the 2008 Financial Crisis raised concerns 
regarding the free market system and the underlying values of capitalism.30The once 
rarely questioned link between economic progress and liberal democracy became 
highlighted. Some political scientists claim the disillusionment with democracy has less 
to do with democracy itself than with the economic policies which have been attached to 
it. The dominant market model of the last several decades has been comprised of 
economic policies centering on neoliberalism.31 The consequence of expanding 




Neoliberalism is comprised of principles which affirm free markets. These 
policies include deregulation of industries and capital flows, reduction in welfare state 
provisions and protections, privatized and outsourced public goods, ending wealth 
redistribution as an economic or social political policy, and large scale financialization. 
Author Wendy Brown deemed neoliberalism as “democracy incorporated.”32 These 
                                                            
29 Piore. "Economic Policy in the Time of Reactionary Populism." 35. 
30 Black. “Revitalizing Democracy Assistance to Counter Threats to Democratization.” 6. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Wendy Brown. "Undoing Democracy: Neoliberalism’s Remaking of State and Subject." In Undoing the 




policies have stirred criticism after decades of their application. Intensified inequality, 
crude commoditization and commerce, and increased corporate influence in government 
have culminated in economic instability. Critics emphasize that liberty was transferred to 
economic life from political life though an extensive meshing of the economy with 
democracy.33 
1.4 Discussion 
The existing literature indicates the importance of neoliberalism, globalization, 
and recession have when explaining the economy’s relationship to the modern decline of 
democracy. These three topics are explained to have played a role in decreasing 
economic satisfaction. Decreased economic satisfaction coincided with increased 
political polarization, increased populism, and decreased satisfaction of democracy. The 
available literature provides insight on why there is decreased satisfaction. However, less 
clarity is provided as to how exactly this phenomena developed. 
Author Yotam Margalit claims the importance attached to economic insecurity 
may be inflated in regards to increasing populism and suggests great importance of 
culture and identity. A claim which diminishes the influence economic insecurity has on 
populism would serve as a counter argument to the importance economic stability has to 
democracy. The inflation is due to estimates being made on the level of insecurity when 
supporting populist’s candidates. He argues there are generally lacking measurements, 
                                                            




comparisons, and calculations in this study.34However, assessing further public opinion 
data can provide these measurements as illustrated in Figures 1.2 and 1.3. Additional 
non-economic factors influencing the decline of democracy including ideology and pre-
existing social conditions can also be addressed in this quantitative manner through the 
analysis in each chapter. 
  The roadmap to answering the broader question of how the economy has 
influenced the decline of modern democracy can be found by assessing research divided 
into three sections. These sections include assessing the connection recession has to 
political polarization, the connection that party realignment has to public opinion, and the 
correlation production shifts have to populism. Examining the connections of these more 
distinct topics can provide more clarity and depth associated to the relationship the 
economy has to democracy. 
Critical points on the road map include quantitative data regarding economic 
insecurity, unemployment, income inequality, financial impact fragmentation, 
radicalization of political parties, realignment of political parties, political and social 
alienation of specific groups, backlash to immigration, nationalism, and blame. These 
important points reveal decreased public opinion of government which animated voting 
behavior. This voting behavior is represented through political polarization and populism 
and is a reflection of how citizens view their democracy through an economic lens.  
                                                            
34 Yotam Margalit "Economic Insecurity and the Causes of Populism, Reconsidered." The Journal of 




The contribution of this research is the information which can be gathered by 
reviewing more specific topics within the roadmap when demonstrating the connection 
globalization, neoliberalism, and recession have to democracy.  Assessment of these 
specific points will allow a pattern to emerge which was not previously visible. 
Neoliberal polices ranging back decades had a negative impact on the manufacturing 
sector which coupled with globalization. The financial crisis then worsened the negative 
impact of these economic and internationalization endeavors.  Economic inequality, 
insecurity, dissatisfaction, and fragmentation as represented by the public opinion 
analysis prove economic instability influences political stability and satisfaction. Political 
polarization and populism emerged as consequence to economic complications which 











2. Chapter 1: Recession and Political Polarization in America 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The topic of political polarization among U.S. citizens has been emerging more 
and more frequently in recent years. Polarization as part of this political context is 
defined as the increase of citizens who identify near to the extreme ends of the political 
aisle. An increase in extreme identification will coincide with a decrease of identification 
within the moderate middle section of the partisan spectrum. Political division is 
important due to the claimed negative effects it produces.  
2.1.1 Background 
 
Rising levels of division have been argued by political scientists to cause a 
decrease in the capability of Congress to produce bipartisan legislation.35 These 
challenges generate a political stalemate and policy gridlock which ultimately hinders 
congressional productivity and a marked decline in the number of bills produced.36A 
widened ideological gap makes it more difficult for the parties to overcome their 
differences and reach compromises. Congressional inefficiency, therefore, provides an 
illustration of the negative effects which political polarization has on democracy. It is 
damaging the quality and quantity of public policy within an integral government 
establishment.37  The example of Congress’s inefficiency provides some clarity on the 
effects of polarization. However, there appears to be less agreement on the cause of the 
division.  
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Surveys of public opinion suggest that there has been a recent spike of 
polarization over the past decade and many accredit the phenomenon, in part, to the Great 
Recession.38 This revelation can direct research toward the question of: how does 
economic recession influence political polarization? Existing literature on this question 
emphasizes the importance associated to impact variation. There is considerable variation 
over who is impacted during a recession and how extensive the damage can be. Impact 
serves to guide economic policy which then provokes political disagreement among 
citizens as a consequence.  
Research can provide a road map to answering questions concerning the 
connection that political polarization has to recession. The literature addresses and 
assesses a specific range of topics which comprise this road map. These topics include: 
changes in partisan identification, views of economic system fairness, measurements of 
economic satisfaction, electoral outcomes, a transformation of the political parties, and 
the diminishment of moderate votes. Examining the existing literature and available 
public opinion polling will illustrate how recession increases polarization. The partisan 
divide has increased over decreasing economic satisfaction, worsening income inequality, 
division and fragmentation of the public based on impact, and distrust in government 
through a radicalization of the political parties. Partisan views, unemployment, and 
income inequality become the critical evidence in this assessment. 
Increased partisan views, unemployment, and income inequality in association 
with this study can be then be applied through a comparative data analysis methodology. 
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This analysis, which identifies broader trends and patterns, allows one to join the 
academic conversation over how recessions threaten democracy by increasing political 
polarization.  
2.2 Literature Review 
 
One key concept that is revealed by the existing literature is the importance of 
impact variation. Variation regarding who specifically is impacted during the crisis and 
how extensively is important to explaining the connection recession has to political 
polarization. The impact of a financial crisis serves to guide economic policy preferences. 
Impact variation is explained through a variety of sources which examine partisan 
identification, economic system fairness, economic satisfaction, income inequality, 
unemployment, electoral outcomes, political parties, and moderate votes. Disagreements 
over policy preferences can first be illustrated by modern increases of partisan self-
identification. 
2.2.1 Partisan Identification 
 
Recent literature and survey data reveals marked increases in partisan self-
identification. These resources demonstrate that political polarization of citizens has 
increased since 2000.39 Self-described conservatives as well as liberals have made up the 
demographic majority of the Republican and Democrat parties from 2000 to 2012.  The 
Self-described conservatives rose from 59% in 2000 to 68% in 2012. Those who 
identified as liberal increased from 27% to 39% during the same time frame.40  A marked 
                                                            




deterioration of moderate identification also occurred.41 These increases in partisan 
identification coincided with a change in view of economic system fairness after the 
financial crisis. 
2.2.2 Economic System Fairness 
 
Political views of the economic fairness associated with the American economic 
system, deteriorated as a result of the Great Recession. Survey data revealed a partisan 
split regarding this decline. Polling questioned whether the system unfairly favored 
powerful interests or if it was generally fair to most citizens. The result of the polling 
revealed a divide based on political party. 
Almost 84% of Democrats believed the system was unfair as of 2018 which was 
an increase from 76% in 2014.42 Republicans also viewed it as 54% unfair and then 57%, 
respectively. 80% of wealthy Democrats with an annual income of over $100,000.00, 
believed the economic system to be unfair.43 Conversely, 60% of Republicans with the 
same annual income viewed the American system as fair. It is also important to note that 
51% of Republicans who had an annual income of less than $30,000.00 viewed the 
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economic system as unfair.44 These statistics suggest there is a correlation of income 
regarding the fairness views of the American system, but it can depend on partisanship. 
More people deemed the system unfair if they were in a low-income bracket. Therefore, 
investigating how the recession impacts income inequality may provide more insight. 
Due to financial stress and insecurity during a recession, income inequality can 
cause discrepancies in perceptions of fairness in the citizens. Income can become more 
volatile and is subject to steeper increases and decreases during these times of economic 
difficulty. For example, lacking health insurance and the ability to pay bills directly links 
to insecurity as these are necessities. This insecurity is important because 28% of 
Americans reported having one or both of these insecurities in 2004 even before the 
Great Recession45. In 2004, 15.8% of citizens reported pressure to pay whiles. This was 
an increase from 12.6% in 1991.46Financial difficulties signal problems in maintaining a 
decent standard of living and meeting basic needs for a large portion of the populationand 
has been increasing according to The General Social Survey.47 The financial crisis, 
ultimately, provided clear recognition of inequality based on income. This example of 
income inequality also highlighted the importance of employment. 
Political attitudes on employment opportunity can shift in response to recession 
because the employment available to citizens is reduced. Employment opportunity is 
determined by a worker’s, education, training, skills, expertise, and other competencies. 
Education and other attributes should enhance relative levels of job security during 
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economic crises and diminish the risk of long-term unemployment.48 By contrast, those 
with lower incomes and less education are unfortunately expected to be at the greatest 
disadvantage. Such disadvantages can lead these groups to comprise a larger number of 
the unemployed during recession.49 
Unemployment, therefore, serves as a polarizing issue. It guides policy 
preferences by aggravating class issues through economic concepts of “the haves” and 
“the have nots.”50 Economic hardship that impacts people due to unemployment will 
often create more welfare and redistributive policies.51 People on the higher ends of the 
income spectrum often will often steer away from these policies or strive to block them 
based on partisanship. This concept can be further supported by recorded data which 
indicates who specifically was impacted the most by recession created unemployment 
and how important the issue truly is. 
2.2.3 Economic Satisfaction 
 
Survey data taken during periods of high unemployment reveal the connection 
that monetary earnings and job availability has to measurements of general economic 
satisfaction. Public opinion surveys measured the satisfaction that Americans had about 
the economy as well as their perceptions of job availability from 2004 to 2009. In 
November 2007, the unemployment rate was 4.7% and reached 10% in October 
                                                            
48Brian C. Thiede and Shannon M. Monnat, “The Great Recession and America’s Geography of 
Unemployment,” Demographic Research 35 (2016): 897. 
49Thiede and M. Monnat, “The Great Recession and America’s Geography of Unemployment,” 897. 
50Enns. and McAvoy. “The Role of Partisanship in Aggregate Opinion.” 631. 
51Peter K Enns. and Gregory E McAvoy. “The Role of Partisanship in Aggregate Opinion.” Political 
Behavior 34 no. 4 (2012): 630. 
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2009.52Additional measurements revealed that 6.3% of all jobs were lost during the Great 
Recession.53 This unemployment, therefore, resulted in a loss of monetary earnings of US 
citizens as a whole.54 Losses by certain groups had a negative impact on public opinion 
surveys which measured job availability and economic satisfaction. 
In 2004, a measured 18% of respondents indicated very unsatisfied.55 When 
measured again in 2009, the survey results of citizens who provided a very unsatisfied 
response rose to an astounding 70%. General satisfaction of the economy had greatly 
declined. This decline coincided with the measured perception of the difficulty associated 
with job availability. In 2004, 59% responded that jobs were difficult to find. The same 
survey taken again in 2009 measured that 80% responded that jobs were difficult to 
find.56 
In 2008, a survey asking what the most important economic issue facing 
Americans today was, 13% responded with, “jobs”. In less than one year, the same 
survey data taken in 2009 showed that 42% responded with, “jobs”.57 These 
measurements indicate that loss of earnings involved with unemployment and the 
associated unavailability of jobs can sway economic satisfaction. It is important to note 
that white collar workers suffer less than blue collar workers.58 The lower and middle 
class was also affected much more by recession than the upper class. It was likely that 
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blue collar workers comprised the largest increase of the unsatisfied reports. Therefore, 
specific sectors and industries dominated by class such as manufacturing and 
construction suffered the most and experienced the highest unemployment rates to that 
point. 
Recent data reveals that increased unemployment which was triggered by the 
Great Recession served to impact citizens differently in regard to their gender, race, and 
age. Data compiled during the beginning of the 2007 recession confirms that white men 
had a 3.6% unemployment rate compared to 3.2% of white women. Black men had a 
9.1% unemployment rate while black women had a 6.5% rate. Hispanic men had a 6.2% 
unemployment rate and Hispanic women had a 4.9% rate. Indeed, the numbers show that 
men and racial minorities often were uniquely disadvantaged.59 Available data also 
confirmed that young people were impacted the most by unemployment.60 Citizens aged 
16 to 19 had an unemployment rate of 14.4%. Citizens aged 20 to 24 had a 6.4% 
unemployment rate. 
The variation of impact associated to recession is evident. However, how 
unemployment disrupts the contentment of citizens to generate a political response lacks 
clarity. Data of measured well-being can serve to illustrate why recession induced 
unemployment is a polarizing issue. Economic satisfaction and employment appear to 
correlate with how citizens view their well-being during the crisis. 
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Survey data taken during the Great Recession ranging on a three-point scale from 
very unhappy to happy revealed an increase in the unhappy selection which varied by 
specific groups.61 Men in general, African Americans, and Hispanics made up for the 
largest increase. It appears that certain groups have more general discontent than others 
based on economic factors, and these groups appeared to be more disadvantaged during 
the recession. When certain groups have more discontent than other groups, there will be 
a consequence in voting behavior which is again ties to economic performance 
satisfaction. 
2.2.4 Electoral Outcomes 
 
Research suggests that low economic performance will influence electoral 
outcomes. The claim is that voters punish administrations for bad economic policies. 
Research on the political cost of inflation and recession reveals that shifts in the balance 
of party support over time correlates with economic cycles.62 Political responses to 
economic conditions will most likely be determined by the severity of the conditions and 
the individual’s outlook on the events in the economic arena. Therefore, strong evidence 
of a relationship between general economic conditions and voting behavior can be 
illustrated through the concept of blame on poor economic conditions.63 
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Recognition of the groups who are supposedly responsible for poor economic 
performance will coincide with the creation of a political identification of who is to 
blame.64 Greedy mortgage bankers, naive economists, and inept government regulators 
are broadcasted as the problem.65 These will associate with specific narratives of flawed 
government policies, mismanagement of monetary policy, and runaway congressional 
spending, for example.66 Blame constructed in this manner which is based on the 
identification of groups who are to blame will fuel polarization by creating a general 
concept of “us” versus “them” with political associations.67 This adversarial concept is 
likely the culmination of citizen disagreement and the strongest contribution recession 
provides to polarization as it agitates the political parties. 
2.2.5 Political Party Radicalization 
 
Democrat and Republican elites took strong opposing stands on most of the 
specific policy issues raised by the 2008 financial crisis. There was disagreement on the 
magnitude and composition of an economic stimulus package, extensions of food stamps, 
unemployment insurance, and other safety net programs.68 Recession strengthens the 
division within the parties as it directs voting in favor of or against increasing these 
programs. This division is claimed to produce a loss of compromise for mutual benefit of 
the parties which serve public interest. Blame on the opposing party, disappointment in 
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66 Clark. “Inequality and the Great Recession.” 60. 
67Bermeo, Nancy Gina, and Larry M. Bartels. Mass Politics In Tough Times: Opinions, Votes, and Protest 
In the Great Recession. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. 6. 
68Bartels, Larry M. Bartels "Stress Test: The Political Economy of the Great Recession." In Unequal 
Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age - Second Edition, 278. 
31 
 
both parties, and a loss of confidence in government from the citizens was the 
consequence.69 
Lacking support of government is confirmed by Figure 2.1. The chart measures 
trust in government by political party and ranges from 1958 to 2015. The graphic reveals 
a decline of trust in the government of citizens who identify in both parties beginning in 
the year 1958.  
Figure 2.1. 
 









Beyond Distrust, How Americans View their Government” by the Pew Research Center, Gallup, 
and the National Election Studies.70 
 
                                                            
69 Bartels, Larry M. Bartels "Stress Test: The Political Economy of the Great Recession.” 279. 
70 Beyond Distrust, How Americans View their Government” by the Pew Research Center, Gallup, and the 
National Election Studies. Last Modified November 23, 2015. Retrieved from 
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2015/11/23/1-trust-in-government-1958-2015/. 
 
Fig. 2.1 7 
32 
 
During the Eisenhower Administration, responses of both parties were within the 
70% and 80% range of government trust. These results continually dropped over 
subsequent decades but did have increases in 1980 and 2001. However, reports of 20% 
and below are shown during the Great Recession of 2008 and after. Therefore, trust in the 
government reached its historic lowest level in modern time. To confront the decline, 
author Corwin Smidt suggests the political parties radicalized and fueled polarization. 
The parties gratified and mobilized their supporters in a competitive manner while 
attempting to acquire nonpartisan voters or “floating voters”.71 
2.2.6 Moderate Voters 
 
Moderate or floating voters provide aunique value to the electorate through their 
flexibility. They can change their party support due to unawareness, indifference, or 
indecisiveness. Flexibility, however, is reduced when party differences are clearer. 
Americans can more easily recognize the meaning and consequences of candidate 
differences through polarization. The result is a decrease in ambivalence and indecision 
in voting through party radicalization and Americans will often become more reliable in 
their voting behavior and in which party they support. These dynamics are consequential 
for those voters who otherwise lack partisan connections.72 
 Recession enables independents and the politically inattentive to resemble loyal 
partisans in their attitudes and behavior because an incentive is provided to do so. The 
incentive is through the clarity of candidate differences. Political parties benefit from 
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polarization by gaining support through these usually non-partisan voters. These typically 
indecisive voters are pulled into the polarized vortex of the parties based on economic 
conditions.73 This type of vortex is a byproduct of recession and lends itself to further 
polarization. 
The available literature regarding the influence recession has on political 
polarization leads to a connection of specific topics. It is clear that economic recession 
fuels polarization through changing partisan identification, altering economic system 
fairness views, reducing economic satisfaction and security, influencing electoral 
outcomes, transforming the political parties, and diminishing moderate votes.Viewing 
these sources in a collective manner confirms the importance of the variation associated 
to the impact recession has on people. Some citizens, for example, experience extensive 
financial stress and are heavily burdened by occupational insecurity while others are not. 
Ultimately, research validates the importance of the role recession plays in impact 
variation by increasing inequality. 
The existing sources reveal the importance unemployment and income have in 
association to this inequality. The majority of variation in impact during a recession can 
be related to these two variables which can allow them to be incorporated into an 
analytical data assessment. A case study methodology can be used to further prove 
increases in polarization. It can be used in a quantitative manner to demonstrate increased 
partisanship as suggested in the literature. The Great Recession can be used as a case 
study to supply answers and can be expanded upon by comparing the 2008 financial 
crisis to similar studies of the recession in 1973 and the recession in 1980. Measurement 
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of the defined points on a political identification scale can also be used to test increases in 
political polarization.  
2.3 Data Analysis 
 
Testing the hypothesis that economic recession will increase polarized views on a 
partisan scale can be completed through a case study analysis of American National 
Election Study data. This data can be used to measure changes in a partisan identification 
scale. These changes can be used to identify increases and decreases of political 
identification which can serve to illustrate polarization. Further evidence to support 
increased polarization can then be provided through incorporating a further quantitative 
assessment of the variables discussed in the literature review. 
2.3.1 Methodology 
 
Figure 2.2 provides an illustration of documented political partisan self-
identification ranging from the year 1972 to 2016. This figure captures data reflecting the 
recessions in 1973, 1980, and 2008. The graph, therefore, can be used for the purpose of 
a full case study comparison. The data points range from Extremely Liberal to Extremely 
Conservative which also includes Slightly Liberal and Slightly Conservative. These data 
points act as markers for analysis. Increases in Extremely Liberal and Extremely 
Conservative provide one marker. Decreases in Slightly Conservative and Slightly 
Liberal provide another. These indicate polarization as they reveal self-identification 
moving away from moderate political views toward extreme ones. 
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The information located in Figure 2.3 builds on Figure 2.2 in a more simplistic 
manner. Figure 2.3 measures the strength of a respondent’s partisanship. Increases in 
Strong Partisanship and decreases in Weak Partisanship can be indicative of spikes in 













Liberal-Conservative Self-Identification (Graph by the American National Election StudyCumulative Data 
File dataset, weighted with VCF0009z. (ANES 2016) These materials are based on work supported by the 
National Science Foundation under grant numbers SES 1444721, 2014-2017, the University of Michigan, 
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Strength of Partisanship(Graph by the American National Election StudyCumulative Data File dataset, 
weighted with VCF0009z. (ANES 2016) These materials are based on work supported by the National 
Science Foundation under grant numbers SES 1444721, 2014-2017, the University of Michigan, and 
Stanford University.75 
 
2.3.2 Case Study One 1973 
 
Case study one encompasses the recession of 1973. Unemployment and inflation 
plagued the nation in that time. Unemployment increased from 4.9% in 1973 to 8.5% by 
1975.76 Case study one of data in 1974 indicates a one point increase in both Extremely 
Liberal and Conservative measurements as a result of the recession in 1973. A two-point 
drop in Slightly Liberal with a three-point drop in Slightly Conservative is also present. 
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This data reveals an increase of politically extreme self-identification and a decrease from 
the moderate Slightly Liberal and Conservative segments. The data listed in Figure 1.3 
echoes these findings. After the recession in 1973, there is a one-point increase in Strong 
Partisanship and a four point drop in Weak Partisanship. The first case study, therefore, 
provides a pattern that would confirm the hypothesis that recession increases partisan 
political polarization. 
2.3.3 Case Study Two 1980 
 
Case study two encompasses the recession of 1980 where substantial 
unemployment was also reported. The 1982 data indicates a constant point in Extremely 
Conservative and a one-point decrease in Extremely Liberal after the recession of 1980. 
A one-point drop in Slightly Liberal which coincides with a constant point in Slightly 
Conservative is shown. The data reveals decreases in self-identification on the liberal side 
of the spectrum and consistency on the conservative end. The information provided by 
Figure 2.3 slightly differs from this conclusion. The data points after the recession in 
1980 convey a four point rise in Strong Partisanship. A one point increase in Weak 
Partisanship is also shown but the increase of the strong identification is still dominant. 
The data does not perfectly mimic the clear results of case study one. Figure 2.2 does not 
confirm the hypothesis, but it also does not disprove it. The focus can then be on Figure 
2.3.  
The graphic used for the second case study does suggest a correlation of the 1980 
recession time frame to marked increases in Strong Partisanship. Strong Partisanship 
served to eclipse the small increase in Weak Partisanship. Ultimately, the result of case 
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study two provides support for the hypothesis that recession increases partisan political 
polarization even if the evidence is not as strong as case study one. 
2.3.4 Case Study Three 2008 
 
Case study three comprises the timeframe of the Great Recession. The data 
between 2008 and 2012 indicates first consistency and then a one-point increase in 
Extremely Conservative. This occurred with a one-point increase and then a constant 
point in Extremely Liberal. A two- point increase in Slightly Conservative and Liberal is 
also recorded. Data suggesting increases in the moderate categories would serve to 
disprove the hypothesis that recession increases political polarization. However, it is 
important to note that the impacts of the Great Recession may have lasted over a longer 
period of time than the other two case studies. This may distort the conclusions which can 
be formulated from the data. Indeed, after 2012 there is a clear decrease in both Slightly 
Liberal and Slightly Conservative. More polarized data may comprise the years after 
2016 which is still being compiled by the American National Election Study. 
When assessing the results of these case studies, case study three and its possible 
distortion of data bring forth important discoveries when interpreting recession triggered 
polarization. Both Figures 2.2 and 2.3 illuminate evidence of fluctuating polarization. 
The graphics illustrate how these views can change drastically in as little as one or two 
years in accordance with a recession. However, The Great Recession is a unique 
occurrence which officially ended as of 2009. The timeframe is similar in length to the 
other case studies but the emergence of the full shockwaves of the Great Recession and 
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the dissipation of its effects may not have been similar in timeframe. Long lasting and 
deep political polarization may have been the consequence of this extraordinary crisis. 
2.3.5 Variable Assessment 
 
The case study analysis can be expanded upon through a quantitative assessment 
of U.S. Census Bureau and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data. These sources illustrate 
income inequality and unemployment which become important variables as identified by 
the literature review. Data of income inequality is represented by Figures 2.4 and 2.5 and 












“Income and Poverty in the United States: 2018-Current Population Reports” by The U.S. Census Bureau. 
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Unemployment Holds Steady for Much of 2016 but edges Down in the Fourth Quarter by 
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey.79 
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Unemployment Rates, by Race and Hispanic or Latino Ethnicity, Quarterly Averages, 

















Unemployment Holds Steady for Much of 2016 but edges Down in the Fourth Quarter by 
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey.80 
 
2.3.6 Income Inequality 
 
The influence of recession in regard to income inequality by race is illustrated by 
Figure 2.4. The graph provides measurements of household income from the years 1959 
to 2018. A marked income inequality that exists for some minority groups is illuminated. 
The data in the shaded sections also confirms that income decreased for all races during 
times of recession. It is clear that specific groups of citizens are atthe top and the bottom 
of the income scale. However, the graphic does show that incomes in all brackets of the 
scale did decline during the recession. This could allow for researchers to question the 
importance of these short-lived decreases in income if everyone experienced a decline. 
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The income itself would be of vital importance when discussing the full impact it has on 
the people who reside in these monetary brackets. 
There is evidence to support this concept of specific brackets of income being 
impacted more heavily due to the measured existence of increasing general income 
inequality since the late 1970s. Figure 2.5 illustrates a splintering of incomes which 
continues to grow through year 2017. The data reveals the important influence recession 
has on income. If income inequality has continually risen for the past 30 years, the impact 
of recession will apply to specific groups and specific income brackets more heavily with 
each subsequent recession. Essentially, the inequality based on race is further aggravated 
which impacts certain groups on the lower end more drastically even though all groups 
saw a decline. Therefore, inequality represented by race is further exacerbated as it 
couples with a general pattern of increasing income inequality from the 1970s. This rise 
in income inequality is important regarding recession because it will place a further strain 
on the already existing inequality.  
Figure 2.4 offers a median graphic for incomes to further convey the concept of 
inequality based on race. However, the graphic can also be used to discuss the importance 
associated with just income brackets. For instance, there are citizens who earn over 
$100,000.00 annually. There are also citizens who earn under $30,000.00 annually. These 
divergent incomes can help assess the impact disparity of recession. 
 A citizen who earns under $30,000.00 annually and then accumulates less due to 
the recession will struggle differently than those of a higher income. A decrease from 
$90,000.00 annually to $85,000.00 annually will be a less devastating factor than a 
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decrease from $30,000.00 to $25,000.00 annually. Income decreases from a recession 
leads to a worsened inequality when it causes certain groups to struggle with paying for 
necessities. The vast difference in impact will serve to steer political identity and voting 
behavior as they correlate to each of these groups.  
2.3.7 Unemployment 
 
Income inequality is not the only variable that can serve to steer political behavior 
during recession. Unemployment is also increased which will correlate to a citizen’s 
political attitudes as discussed in the literature review. Figure 2.6 emphasizes a clear 
increase in unemployment associated with times of recession asrepresented by the shaded 
areas. The spikes are clear in 1973, 1980, and 2008. Figure 2.7, further delineates the 
unemployment by race and ethnicity to again show the breakdown of unemployment 
ranges from 1990.  
Assessment of these variables illustrates the structure and clear inequalities 
associated with citizens in regard to income and unemployment. The quantitative 
information listed in Figures 2.2 to 2.7 mirrors the concepts conveyed in existing 
literature. Strong partisan identification spikes coincided with decreases in income, 
increases in inequality, and increases in unemployment. 
The Recession in 2008 is important in this context because the gap in time for the 
high unemployment rate to normalize is much larger than earlier recessions. This would 
support the previously discussed concept that the effects of the Great Recession took a 
longer amount of time to emerge as well as dissipate. Evidence to support this notion is 
apparent in both the case study analysis and the variable assessment through a pattern of 
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inequality reaching back many years. Meshing this research together can provide further 
clarity and a conclusion on how recession influences political polarization. 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
 Synthesis of the data analysis with the literature review can now provide the 
answer to the research question of the relationship recession has to political polarization. 
The importance of economic satisfaction, employment, income, and equality can then be 
illustrated in this context. The contribution this research provides, addressing possible 
counter arguments, and revealing additional related areas of study can now be completed. 
2.4.1 Discussion 
 
The culmination of the evidence in this study provides support for the statement 
that recession increases political polarization by increasing partisan identification, 
increasing unemployment and income inequality, producing an economic fragmentation 
of citizens based on impact, increasing hostility through blame, driving the political 
parties to radicalize, and decreasing moderate voters. These complications served to 
increase broader inequality, decrease trust in government, produce policy gridlock in 
Congress, and ultimately threaten democracy. 
2.4.2 Ideology Counter Argument 
 
One counter argument involving an economic based conversation of political 
polarization and recession can involve ideology. Indeed, public opinion polling which 
was discussed in the literature review revealed a high number of Democrats making 
$100,000.00 annually viewing the American economic system as unfair. This would 
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indicate some form of core values or principles associated to how they vote. Voting on 
this belief would counter the importance of class issues and the “haves” and the “have 
nots” narrative relating to polarization. This counter argument would weaken claims 
which emphasize the importance of income and suggest recession may not heavily alter 
beliefs or how citizens vote.  
However, to contrast an emphasis on ideology, one could argue against the 
importance that ideological voters have in regard to an assessment of polarization. These 
ideologies would be present in partisan identification but the radicalization of the parties 
has a strong association to competition and moderate voters. Radicalization of the parties 
would no doubt exacerbate and feed off of strong ideological beliefs. However, if strong 
core values comprise how a citizen votes on an ideological basis, the opposing party 
would likely be unable to sway this citizen. The parties are competing for the non-
ideological voters instead which have become more accessible due to recession. 
Authors Steven Levisky and Daniel Ziblatt explain the danger associated to 
polarization when opponents are not being viewed as legitimate or dangerous. Ideology is 
no doubt important to how citizens interpret this legitimacy. However, if authors suggest 
that political parties have an inability to fully shape or change citizen’s perceptions it can 
be suggested that ideology is a pre-existing condition which is being aggravated by 
recession. This inflammation leads to blame, a need of voters to punish administrations 
for bad economic performance, and a radicalization of the political parties. This 
radicalization of the parties in an adversarial manner can lead citizens to feel as though 
they are not properly represented which increases distrust in government. Authors Kyle 
Saunders and Alan I. Abramowitz suggest that this distrust and party radicalization also 
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serve to energize electorates and stimulate political participation in a competitive 
manner.81 
The further contribution of this study on recession and polarization is the 
illumination it provides to the connection these topics have to broader concepts. Income 
inequality has been increasing for decades and is at the highest it has ever been. This fact 
likely made the Great Recession have more of an impact than previous recessions where 
unequal income was not as prevalent. This pattern of income inequality also highlights a 
long-standing pattern of inequality based on race. Since 1960, inequality in this context 
of income has not improved in a meaningful manner for minorities, and the same can be 
said for issues of unemployment. Additionally, certain occupations, industries, and 
sectors within the economy are more vulnerable to recession than others. 
The Great Recession appears be the cataclysm which ignited the deep partisan 
divide present in American society today. However, the quantitative analysis provides the 
significance of this research and illustrates the depth associated with the conversation of 
polarization. The data illuminates a pattern of longstanding inequalities which reaches 
back almost 50 years and has played a role. Polarization in modern times is the 
culmination of years of increasing inequalities and lack of progress in reducing them. All 
of which was exacerbated by economic crises. 
Additionally, the figures regarding unemployment and income inequality during 
times of financial crisis indicate their relevance to long lasting consequences. The graphs 
                                                            





illustrate that it took years for income and employment to stabilize back to the levels 
prior to the Great Recession. This is in contrast to the fluctuations of these variables 
attached to years prior and after other listed recessions. The Great Recession appeared to 
have a slow recovery and it seems the political consequences remained even after the 
economy recovered. 
The study of recession and polarization can be further explored through the 
revealed pattern of inequality which reaches back decades. The economic policy of the 
American capitalist society of the twenty first century was comprised of 
neoliberalism.82Examining how neoliberalism contributes to inequality and creates a 
vulnerability of certain economic sectors to crisis may prove enlightening. Dissecting 
neoliberal policies, therefore, may provide further evidence of the important role 
employment and income equality have in producing political polarization and the 
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3. Chapter 2: Party Realignment, Neoliberalism, and the Modern Decline of Public 
Opinion in Great Britain 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The United States has been the focal point of study regarding partisan political 
polarization to date.83American politics has experienced extensive increases in observed 
division between traditional conservative values and progressive liberal principles. The 
established literature on the United States’ experience differs from the more recent 
evidence of polarization in the United Kingdom. Discussion on the topic of a political 
divide from the British perspective is fairly new and has been ignited by the nation’s 
relationship with Europe.84 Therefore, the conventional wisdom offered by highlighting 
only the perspective of the United States may provide only part of the picture when 
researching topics on political polarization. Incorporating the considerations of strife in 
policy attitudes through the lens of the United Kingdom can remedy the lacking totality 
of narrow and exclusive research on the United States. 
Patterns in British attitudes have evolved in a different manner than those in 
America. A weakening of party allegiances and a fragmentation of economic and social 
public opinion has occurred over the past few decades.85 The established political 
structures are experiencing difficulty in securing the diverse views among party 
supporters. The differences between these varied positions and their connection to the 
United Kingdom’s relationship with Europe present one of the greatest current political 
challenges for the country. These new political identities preceded the recent European 
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Union referendum and tie back to long term party realignment and increased concern 
about cultural and economic changes in the United Kingdom.86 Tracing previous British 
party realignment may provide further understanding of the formation of these identities 
through their influence on public attitudes.  
3.1.1 Background 
 
Substantial party realignment can be traced back to Britain’s Labour Party success 
in the 1997 Election. This specific realignment has significance because there is study of 
its connection involving a shift toward the dominating neoliberal economic censuses in 
the United Kingdom at that time. The full impact of this shift may be clearer in more 
recent times. Thusly, a timeframe case study comparison methodology using the Great 
Recession can provide insight. The recession would likely have impacted the economic 
policies which comprise neoliberalism and influenced public opinion as a consequence.  
Examination of public opinion as it pertains to the substantial disagreement in 
Britain can illustrate why neoliberal economic policies are at odds with modern 
democracy. Realignment of the Labour Party influenced public opinion after the 
recession by decreasing views of government, economic confidence, and well being. This 
decline of public opinion in these topics made citizens question if Britain should maintain 
European Union membership. Political polarization, class issues, populism, and 
nationalism then flourished. 
This research can join the scholarly conversation on modern political polarization 
by examining what created the weakening of party allegiances, expanded the 
fragmentation of public attitudes, and caused the recent divide on European Union 




membership. These issues can be explored through providing an answer to the research 
question, “how has realignment of the Labour Party toward neoliberalism in the United 
Kingdom influenced public opinion after the Great Recession?” Party realignment is 
defined in this context as abandoning long standing policy positions and repositioning the 
programmatic outlook of Labor to meet modern aspirations and preferences.87 
The schools of thought which reside in the present literature define a roadmap to 
answering this research question. The points on this roadmap include: the furtherance of 
political party core values, efforts for party control of the economic narrative, resulting 
party realignment for market and public adaptation, and Brexit disagreements. Exploring 
these topics will reveal the pathway of what resulted in decreased positive public opinion 
on views of government, politicians, and economic satisfaction. How these views 
ultimately altered issue attention of the British population will also be illuminated. 
Literature on core values can be presented first to reveal the roots of this alteration 
through emphasizing the importance of party ideology. 
3.2 Literature Review 
 
The current Labour Party principles center on equality and collectivism. These 
values would be channeled through a focus on Keynesian economics, nationalization, 
centralized planning of a mixed economy, and a welfare state.88 Under Keir Starmer’s 
current leadership, the Labour Party strived to eliminate structural causes of poverty, 
reduce wage inequality and housing costs, increase minimum wage, cap overdraft fees 
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and interest on loans, regulate the labor market to end exploitation of all workers, and 
establish a humane immigration system.89 These values differ from the Conservative 
Party ideals. 
3.2.1 Political Party Core Values 
 
The Conservative and Unionist Party’s focus is centered on the idea that 
businesses are at the heart of a successful economy. A clear emphasis is on equality of 
opportunity, property, and government operation through checks and balances.90 Under 
Prime Minster, Boris Johnson, the current Conservative Party is driven to control debt, 
invest in infrastructure, establish a point style based immigration control system, and 
stopping raises to the income tax rate and national insurance.91 It is these party values and 
principles that comprise manifesto priorities and statements which serve to drive the 
economic initiatives of both the dominant British political parties. These core values will 
be important as they will connect to current public opinion which will reach back to the 
influential historic realignment of the Labour Party. However, this can raise questions 
regarding how much influence the political parties themselves have on public opinion. 
Articles written by George Argitis and Christos Pitelis indicate there is no 
substantive or statistically significant evidence that voters adjust their perceptions of 
party’s left-right positions in response to policy statements. Voters do not adjust their 
perceptions on the basis of party manifestos or declarations of intention. Political 
elections suggest that the parties campaign on the basis of their manifestos but there is no 
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evidence of partisan adjustment of citizen’s thoughts in response. These sources, 
therefore, claim the parties have an inability to fully shape citizen’s perceptions. An 
assimilation of new political information to schemas that are already in place occurs.92 
What these authors are potentially missing regarding this idea, however, is their failure to 
see the possible influence parties have beyond their ability to change voter partisan 
identification. This concept is critical to assessing party realignment consequences. 
3.2.2 Control of the Economic Narrative 
 
The inability of the parties to alter voter perceptions is important. It will connect 
to the portion of the public that is politically inattentive according to scholars James 
Adams, Lawrence Ezrow, and Zeynep Somer-Topcu. The political parties will attempt to 
tap into the uninformed, undecided, or politically inactive. The parties are ultimately 
striving, in an opportunistic manner, to activate these groups through the manifestation of 
an adversarial narrative.93 The parties challenge the sincerity of the other’s economic 
policy promises. Gains on one side become associated to failure or loss of ground on the 
other.94 Intensified disagreement can be claimed to be created through these hostile 
narratives. They further mobilize existing party voters while acting to incorporate and 
drain the pool of politically moderate or inactive voters. 
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The inability of political parties to fully shape citizen’s perceptions leaves them 
with limited options to gain support in certain circumstances. It appears they can either 
polarize or they can alter their policy goals in accordance to the political climate and 
market to pull in more support. A transformation is what occurred with the Labour Party 
in the late 1990s. The party realigned because polarizing would not produce electoral 
success in the political climate at that time. However, it seems as though the opposite 
circumstance which calls for polarization emerged years later. 
3.2.3 Realignment for Market and Public Adaptation 
 
Realignment, in 1997 by the Labour Party, served to further the existing 
neoliberal consensus. The importance of this occurrence can be illustrated by explaining 
the historic expansion of Margaret Thatcher’s policies, The Conservative Party’s victory 
in 1992, and the General Election in 1997. Examining the background and rise of these 
policies can reveal why their expansion conflicts with the traditional goals of the Labor 
Party and why this shift will impact public opinion in the future. 
Since Margaret Thatcher’s rise to power in 1979, the neoliberal consciousness has 
controlled economic policymaking in the United Kingdom. Neoliberal principles 
recognize markets as the main engine for economic growth.  Government 
macroeconomic policy should prioritize price stability over full employment, refrain from 
actively managing the business cycle, and intervene on the supply end only to correct 
market failures. Neoliberals believe that a high level of employment is achieved through 
microeconomic polices such as labor market de-regulation. Rapid economic growth will 
stem from supply polices aimed to increase the long-term potential of the economy which 
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includes privatizing state owned-enterprises, product market deregulation, financial 
market liberalization, and free trade. These neoliberal values guided the overall British 
policy framework which continued into the 1990s with the Conservative Party’s re-
election in 1992.95 
The Conservative Party’s 1992 general election victory on the back of a short 
term recession proved to be crucial for the evolution of economic policy-making in 
Britain. With 41.9% of the vote, the Conservatives were re-elected, but with a diminished 
majority. However, proving victorious, they would set out to complete the neoliberal 
revolution with further privatization and continued de-regulation. The British economy 
then began its longest sustained period of growth ever after 1992.96 Low interest rates 
fostered investment, a weaker pound fueled exports, and tight spending control policy 
increased business confidence. This led to five years of economic growth between 1992 
and 1997. New income spread widely which hindered income inequality as a result. The 
neoliberal consensus continued, but a decline in manufacturing was eroding the 
Conservative Party’s persuasiveness to portions of the general public.97 This concept 
reaches back to Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party conference speech in 1980. 
Thatcher refused to ‘court public opinion’ by reversing unpopular policies regarding 
interest rates and unemployment.98 Persuasiveness was ultimately key in the 1997 
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election. The Conservative party did not realign to appeal to manufacturing. The Labour 
party, however, did realign.  
The 1997 General Election signified a realignment of the Labour Party which 
embraced a “Thatcherite” version of neoliberalism after Tony Blair became its leader. In 
their 1997 election manifesto, a “New Labour” promised to pursue a third way centrist 
policy that differs from the old left and the conservative right. The purpose of this change 
was focused on the idea that “Old Labour” had failed to meet the policy preferences of 
the electorate. Society changed and the party needed to change with it.99 Party outlook 
was altered to meet current aspirations and preferences.  However, this party realignment 
ultimately accepted neolibleralism and Labour had sacrificed many of its social 
democratic goals to underscore the Conservatives.100 
Realignment gave the Labour Party the opportunity to grab hold of the economic 
narrative but further solidified neoliberalism into British economic policy in the process. 
The party altered itself and changed as an adaptation to the market and to the political 
climate it resided within in order to produce its victory.101This party adaptation sparked 
the beginnings of strong division in the United Kingdom and the results are clearly 
reflected through the current Brexit dilemma. The argument is that a detachment of the 
party from a specific portion of the public occurred which produced long lasting 
consequences. 
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3.2.4 Brexit Disagreements 
 
The United Kingdom’s vote to leave the European Union signified the end of the 
period of the broad neoliberal economic policy consensus which emerged in the previous 
decades.102 Literature suggests that the end of the previous general economic agreement 
can be represented through the effects that EU expansion had on the UK regarding 
migration, disagreement on what leaving the union would produce, and the formation of a 
hostile narrative known as “Euroscepticism.” 
Migration into the UK has increased with the expansion of the EU since 2004. 
The high level of associated migration created discontent because competition for 
employment, especially for low-skilled, low pay, and insecure work increased as a result. 
Political scientists claimed that the consequences of the financial crisis and strict 
neoliberal policies have disproportionately affected the social conditions of older, blue 
collar, and lower skilled people. A disproportionate impact also coincided with a hostile 
narrative to place blame for domestic issues. Criticism of integration with the Europe 
culminated in what has been termed “Euroscepticism.”103 
The dominant political parties have tried significantly to control the debate on 
Europe within the UK which contributes to the nation’s weak and skeptical relationship 
with the EU. The parties response to this relationship with Europe produced a cycle of 
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pragmatism and radicalization of the Conservatives and Labour as they stepped in and 
out office which ultimately increased the disruptive aspects of Euroscepticism.104 These 
disruptive aspects became tied to the parties which made support for populist ideologies 
to increase. 
Authors Steve Corbett and Anand Menon believe that Euroskepticsm has led to 
increases in populism and nationalism, opposition to representative liberal democracy, 
and discontent of immigration policies. These beliefs can be attributed to the idealization 
of a “heartland” and the particular social values that make up this heartland. Protection of 
these values is, consequently, widening societal divisions and constructing a gravitation 
pull away from global leadership.105 This pull has a strong correlation to economic 
policy, the political parties, and class. 
The populist argument against continued union membership is that almost 60% of 
British exports currently ship to countries outside of the European Union. Therefore, 
there is little support for keeping the British economy bound by the Union’s regulations 
and leaving would enhance the global capabilities of the UK by increasing its 
sovereignty.106 The populist’s goal was to force British policymakers to focus on these 
types of economic interests. On the opposite end of the spectrum, arguments against 
leaving the Union center on what the damaging economic consequences would be. They 
speculate that the consequences would include declines in GDP, rises in unemployment, 
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declines in real income, and a decline in the pound sterling exchange rate.107 With a 52% 
vote to leave and a 48% vote to stay, disagreement on Brexit reveals strong societal 
division in the United Kingdom and each side is mainly represented by the Labour and 
Conservative Parties.108 However, this representation is distorted by the populists. 
Bryn Jones and Michael O’Donnell speculate that Brexit is a critical modern issue 
in British politics. These authors believe Brexit represents a full public desire to “exit” 
neoliberalism itself. Neoliberalism was applied for nearly 40 years and it has more 
recently become clear that its principles are failing to meet basic human necessities in 
security, health, and shelter. It is argued that the Great Recession served as the catalyst 
which signified the failure of neoliberalism. It made the substantial problems associated 
to inequalities in wealth and income, public and private debt, and international trade very 
clear. The economic crisis also highlighted unaccountable and under taxed corporations 
who often benefit from exploited labor.109 Opposition and negative public opinion of 
neoliberal policies have become well established as a consequence to these issues. Bryn 
Jones and Michael O’Donnell claim that neoliberalism has increased the power of 
markets and business so deeply that it damaged British democracy. To loosen the 
constrictive hold neoliberalism has on Britain, it appears a draconian level of social, 
political, and economic reform to empower civil society is required.110 
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Klaus Stoltz and Clair Ainsley contribute to this research through their argument 
that neoliberal policies have degraded democracy in the United Kingdom. These scholars 
emphasize that democracy is to include economic, social, cultural, and political 
participation which allows for individual as well as collective forms of representation. 
This would be in addition to decision making by distance governments and corporate 
business elitists.111 With this traditional definition in mind, these authors explain that 
democracy is deteriorating in the UK. Corrosion is occurring because populist 
movements and distrust of politicians and their capacity to serve citizens are increasing. 
Changes in social class are important to understand in this context. Decline in the 
political and democratic representation of working-class people is attributed to a series of 
economic and industrial trends which served to undermine their labor centric 
values.112Membership of the European Union has become viewed by many citizens in 
Britain as an obstacle to these social, cultural, and political principles.113 
The existing literature on this topic ultimately suggests that realignment of the 
Labour Party toward neoliberalism since the Great Recession has influenced public 
opinion by increasing disagreement both between the parties and among citizens. These 
produced attitudes and party initiatives have strengthened broader political polarization 
and public discontent. The furtherance of party core values, strives for party control of 
the economic narrative, party realignment for market and public adaptation, and Brexit 
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disagreements, therefore, serve as the evidence to support these assumptions and 
illustrate the changes in public opinion.  
The existing literature does indicate general dissatisfaction and what this 
dissatisfaction produced as a result of party realignment. However, examples of 
quantitatively assessed public opinion data is lacking in this literature. These may 
strengthen the message being conveyed by the existing research and reveal specific 
underlying issues or variables. By including public opinion measurements which were 
produced due to realignment, further clarity as to how this shift in party policy influenced 
the opinions of citizens may be provided. 
3.3 Data Analysis 
 
 Public opinion data can build on the literature review by illustrating why the 
Labour Party’s historic shift toward neoliberalism appeared to increase division in the 
United Kingdom. Data analysis can be completed through a case study comparison 
methodology of public opinion information. The decade before the Great Recession and 
the decade after the crisis would comprise the two timeframes for study. Public opinion 
data for these case studies can be assessed by evaluating changes in general satisfaction, 
changes in economic satisfaction and expectations, and party leader and general 
government satisfaction reported within these two time frames.  
3.3.1 Methodology 
 
Case study one can be completed by dissecting surveys which were conducted by 
Ipsos MORI. Ipsos MORI gathered public opinion data of satisfaction of government and 
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party leaders in a political monitor survey ranging from 1997 to 2020. This information 
provides the data required for analysis of the timeframe before the recession andbuilds a 
foundation for case study two of after the recession.   
3.3.2 Case Study One: Public Opinion Before the Recession 
 
The Labour Party election success in 1997 was tied to its shift toward 
neoliberalism as discussed in the literature review.  This would indicate positive public 
opinion data in the late 1990s which is confirmed by Ipsos MORI. Starting in May 1997, 
respondents reported 46% satisfied with a small percentage of 9% dissatisfied. A slow 
trend of dissatisfaction increased in the following years but reports still remained mainly 
positive. However, starting around February 2002, the reports reversed and more reported 
dissatisfied than satisfied.  
It should come as no surprise that support for government officials aligned with 
overall government satisfaction. Beginning in June 1997, 72% of respondents reported 
satisfaction with Prime Minster Blair’s performance with only 7% dissatisfied. Again, 
there remained positive reports over the next several years with a slow trend of decline. 
More responded as dissatisfied with Blair’s performance than satisfied in the 2002 to 
2003 timeframe. In 2007, Blair ended with 33% satisfied and 60% dissatisfied. This 
negative trend continued with views of Prime Minster Gordon Brown’s performance. A 
similar pattern presented itself when looking at the timeframe after the recession. 




Case study two after the Recession can begin in a similar manner as the first study 
with data offered by Ipsos MORI. In June of 2008, a jarring 78% ofprovided responses 
indicated dissatisfaction with government. These measurements decreased to the 50% 
and 60% range in the following years but did then reveal a continued slow negative trend 
again. By March 2019, 86% responded with dissatisfaction and a miniscule 8% report of 
satisfied views. The same can be said about the satisfaction measurements of party 
leaders.  
In July 2008, only 21% responded with satisfied and 72% with dissatisfied. The 
years following the measurements for each Prime Minister did improve but for each year 
the responses of dissatisfied greatly trumped the number of satisfied responses. As 
revealed with satisfaction reports on general government performance, the dissatisfaction 
responses on party leaders greatly increased again in 2018. The most current measures of 
Prime Minister Boris Johnson also reveal many dissatisfied measurements. However, 
there appears to be an increase on the opposite side to more evenly split the totals.114 
3.3.4 Satisfaction, Key Issue, and Government Confidence Analysis 
 
The increased dissatisfaction of party leaders and government coincided with 
shifts in what issues were focused on, general well being, and economic outlook after the 
recession. These shifts are illustrated in Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3.  Figures 3.4, 3.5, and 
3.6 reveal decreases in the confidence citizens have in government management and 
                                                            

















“Personal and economic well-being in the UK: November 2019” by the Office of National 
Statistics.115 
 
The UK Office of National Statistics data provided in Figure 3.1 measures 
economic expectations of citizens. What citizens expected appears to echo the trends 
presented by their reported personal well being. Unemployment expectations decreased 
after the recession as one would expect as the economy was improving. However, these 
expectations began to increase after 2015 which indicates citizens were losing 
employment confidence. Views of the general economic situation also increased until 
                                                            
115 “Personal and economic well-being in the UK: November 2019”, Office of National Statistics, last 




2014 and then began to decline. Projected expectations of the future economic situation 
similarly increased after the recession and then decreased in 2014.116 
Figure 3.2. 
 









“Personal and economic well-being in the UK: November 2019” by the Office of National 
Statistics” by The Office of National Statistics.117 
 
Figure 3.2 provides public opinion data of personal well being of respondents 
measured by The Guardian. The graph covers feelings of life satisfaction, happiness, and 
that decisions in life are worthwhile. Measurements in these areas improved since the 
Great Recession and reveal a general upward trend. Increases in satisfaction each year 
after the financial crisis indicate a connection of economic hardship to lower reports of 
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well being by citizens. However, these increases appear to plateau around 2015 and then 
begin to decline in 2019.118 
Figure 3.3. 
 



















“Key issues facing Britain, 2009 - 19” by Ipsos MORI.119 
 
 
The charts provided by Figure 3.3 cover public opinion data by Ipsos MORI 
regarding the question of: What is the most important issue in Britain today? The survey 
was taken from 2009 to 2019 and provided statistics on immigration, the National Health 
Service, the economy, the European Union, unemployment, inequality and poverty.  Each 
graphic illustrates the number of respondents who reported the indicated issue as the most 
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important. The economy was the key issue for the majority of respondents at the start of 
the timeframe. Its importance declined as the economic hardship after the Great 
Recession improved. This coincided with a decline in reports of unemployment being the 
most important issue. As the economy improved, the importance of the European Union 
and NHS substantially increased. Immigration did appear to have a large spike but then 
declined as the focus remained on the European Union.  
Figure 3.4. 
How Well Has The UK Government Handled Brexit Talks? 








   “What Do Voters Make of Brexit now?”  by BBC and NatCen Social Research.120 
 
Figure 2.4 conveys public views of how the British government performed in the 
Brexit negotiations. The data is from the perspective of those who supported the position 
of leaving the European Union in 2016. The chart is enlightening because one would 
speculate that support from the perspective of the side which triumphed in the 
referendum outcome would associate with high views of government performance. 
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Interestingly, this is not the case. A jarring 79% of respondents claimed the British 
Government did a poor job of handling the negotiations. This surveyed group was 
victorious in the results of the referendum, yet they still reported dissatisfaction with 
government management. Those who voted to remain and were defeated reported 85% 
poor performance of government. There was a mere 6% difference of how the winning 
and losing sides viewed the government’s handling of Brexit. These views were 
unanimously and substantially poor.121 
Figure 3.5. 
 








   “What Do Voters Make of Brexit Now?”  by BBC and NatCen Social Research122 
 
The graph included in Figure 3.5 examines the confidence British citizens have 
associated to the terms of the referendum results. Over 60% believe they will not receive 
a positive deal from the outcome of Brexit. These numbers serve as evidence of the 
general disagreement within the United Kingdom in many ways. Brexit is a dominating 
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modern political issue in the country and there is clear division on the topic if most 
people believe the outcome will not be positive for them. Lacking approval and 
confidence in the British government is also apparent if the outcome of the referendum is 
predicted to be poor by most citizens. A significant social split within the nation can also 
be interpreted from these data measurements. Brexit touches on many topics including 
employment, migration, international trade, and regional political relations. These issues 
all intertwine with one another and are reflected through the negotiations. Citizens 




















*Figure for Nov 2018 and Mar 2018 is UKIP only; Apr 2019 and pre-EU elections is UKIP and Brexit Party combined;       
figure for Post-EU elections and Jul 2019 is Brexit Party only 
 
“Who Would Win if a General Election Were Held Now?” by the BBC.124 
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Figure 3.6 highlights how party support has changed from the range spanning 
November 2018 to July 2019. Public opinion measurements starting in 2018 reveal low 
support for both the Conservative and Labour Parties which are both shown to be on the 
lower end of under 40%. What the graphic illustrates is how public support for both 
major parties in Britain rapidly decreased in a matter of months as the European Union 
Parliament Elections approached. The final reported measurement shows data points 
which slightly increased after the decline near the elections but remained low of well 
under 30%. The data shows how quickly and considerably public opinion has decreased 
in just the last two years. Polarization associated with these dominant British parties is 
also exposed by the images. The final measurement of support for the parties has an 
extremely low difference of about 1%.125 
When the data is combined it appears that public opinion regarding economic 
outlook, employment expectations, and general well being have a connection to the 
political and economic climate. This was indicated by low measures during the Great 
Recession. Positive opinions began to recover but then appeared to plateau and then 
ultimately decrease again. The focus shifted from the economy to the European Union. 
The more this importance shifted, the more public opinion began to plateau and then 
decline. It can make one question if the economic hardship resulting from the Great 
Recession was masking other growing issues. Satisfaction data on government 
performance, party leaders, and the parties more generally can serve as evidence. This 
                                                            




satisfaction continuously began to decline after 2003 and the worse measurements 
appeared after the great recession and then again in 2019. Thus, the most important issue 
to citizens in the United Kingdom shifted but the measured trend of political 
dissatisfaction remained. 
 Dissatisfaction can be traced back through the past decade with the origin starting 
before the economic crisis. This opinion is supported by the data which was presented by 
case study one. Public opinion before the Great Recession was more positive but 
indicated a pattern of emerging decline. Public opinion after the Great recession 
continued this pattern as measured political satisfaction decayed. Economic outlook and 
well being improved as one would expect as the economy recovered. However, this 
appeared to plateau and then more recently decline even as the focal point shifted away 
from the economy. Dissatisfaction generally remained and increased even as the 
economy was revived. Dissatisfaction, therefore, was likely an underlying issue which 
was worsened by the recession. 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
Clarity on the answer to the research question of, “how has realignment of the 
Labour Party influenced public opinion in the United Kingdom after the Great 
Recession?” can now be provided after combining what was learned from the literature 
review and the case study data analysis. This act by the Labour Party influenced public 
opinion by increasing dissatisfaction of government and party leaders, decreasing 
reported economic confidence and well being, and increased the importance of 
international union membership issues to citizens after the recession. These increases and 
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decreases served to fuel political polarization, aggravate class issues, and trigger 
populism and nationalism. It appears that the Labour party realigned due to the political 
climate in 1997 and strengthened neoliberalism in Britain. This may have proven to be 
counterproductive in the end. The current political climate, years after the recession, is 
now very different. The Labour Party has now reversed itself and polarized under Keir 
Starmer in order to reach back to its core values. 
3.4.1 Discussion 
 
In conclusion, this research provides strong insight on the complications in which 
neoliberal policies of labor market deregulation, privatizing state owned-enterprises, 
product market deregulation, financial market liberalization, and free trade can produce. 
It also demonstrates the impact political parties can have as well as the power they wield 
even if they are incapable of altering pre-existing perceptions. The extensive economic 
and political damage that recessions can cause is illuminated. The considerable 
consequences that policy shifts and changes can ignite are also shown. A display of how 
continued dissatisfaction of certain groups can cause internal political splintering is also 
given. However, the notion explaining that pre-existing perceptions are not changed due 
to political parties may leave room for counter arguments. 
3.4.2 Pre-existing Social Conditions Counter Argument 
 
Authors John Springford and Simon Tilford claim that economics and declines in 
public opinion do not explain rises in populism in the United Kingdom. These researchers 
suggest that income is not a strong indicator of support for radical parties and that 
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economic hardship simply inflames pre-existing tendencies. Economic grievances would 
then have roots in cultural backlash against liberalism and immigration.126 
Support for right wing populist parties is most prevalent among citizens who are 
older, less educated, and more socially conserve.127 However, these rich, elderly, less 
educated, and socially conservative people are almost as likely to support the radical right 
as poor ones. Left wing voters would instead be more likely to trust democratic 
institutions regardless of economic conditions and incomes. Ultimately, these scholars 
suggest that pre-existing social conditions are of importance because “the economy has 
blown wind into the sails of pre-existing nationalist and anti-immigrant political 
movements.”128 
Usage of the sail illustration by John Springford and Simon Tilford can instead be 
claimed to be counterproductive. Declines in public opinion and pre-existing nationalist 
movements would need this economic “wind” to make meaningful and measureable 
movement. The public opinion data assessed in this paper, therefore, proves how 
neoliberal economic policies have provided this critical wind. 
Study of declining public opinion of government, economic confidence, and well 
being in the United Kingdom is significant because it can be applied in a broader sense. 
Political scientists are claiming that a current crisis is occurring in capitalistic economies 
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which has emerged from rising discontent with liberal democracy.129  This collection of 
research offers a Britain centered example of the connection these global problems have 
to the Great Recession and to the resulting economic policies which were activated 
through an alteration of a political party.  The fundamental values associated to these 
policies ultimately acted to drain positive public attitudes so significantly that immense 
social, economic, and political reform is likely needed to replenish them. Therefore, 
neoliberalism may very well be incompatible with modern democracy if it serves to act as 
such a profound anchor on public opinion. 
 The influence manufacturing as an industry has on politics was illustrated by this 
study of party realignment in Britain. Neoliberalism began a trend of dissatisfaction of 
those within this sector of the economy which ties to the current backlash against 
European Union membership. Therefore, examining how international integrative 
policies relate to manufacturing may provide additional evidence to support the claim that 
neoliberalism increases populism. The international integrative polices represented in the 
European Union partnership are an example of globalization. One can then research the 
political consequences that manufacturing shifts to other countries have in association to 
the globalization effort. 
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4. Chapter 3: Manufacturing Production Shifts and the Rise of Populism in the United 
States and the United Kingdom 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Populism has no single definition but is explained by its claim to represent the 
will of the people versus some “other” commonly viewed as corrupt and self serving 
elites. Many of the accounts put forward to explain the rise of populism have centered on 
economic factors. Certain developments such as globalization, technological progress, 
and financial crisis are argued to have transformed labor markets and generated 
widespread dislocation and economic insecurity. These changes(perceived or real) served 
to erode voters trust in the political system and led the “losers” to look to populist parties 
which claim to represent a break from the status quo and offer appealing solutions to 
voters economic troubles.130 
4.1.1 Background 
 
The rise of populism in many established democracies is one of the most notable 
political developments in recent years. Donald Trump’s victory in the US election of 
November 2016 and the Brexit vote in June 2016 have been the center of attention. 
However, the populist issue reaches across a wide range of countries and contexts. 
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Examples include political advances by far right parties in France and Sweden, ethno 
nationalist parties in Poland and Hungary and far left movements in Greece and Spain.131 
In the United Kingdom, efforts to leave the European Union were driven by the 
demands for economic independence. Manufacturing regions have lost prosperity due to 
free trade in the nation. These communities have the experienced high costs of job 
displacement and reduced earnings.132 Similarly, The Trump Administration in the 
United States has emphasized an “America first” along with a “buy American and hire 
American” narrative. The rhetoric suggests and that foreign elements have stolen the 
wealth of the United States.133Economic protectionist policies are proposed as the way to 
ensure the revival of the economy. This kind of initiative will involve creating trade deals 
that are economically beneficial to the American worker and favor American made goods 
over foreign goods.134 These versions of current populism represented by the marked 
political occurrences of Brexit and the Election of Donald Trump have clear connections 
to manufacturing production shifts and trade. 
 To join the scholarly conversation on the modern increases in populism, the 
research question can be asked: how have production shifts influenced populism in the 
last decade? The roadmap to reaching the conclusion to this question will include 
examining the policies which started the shifts, the financial impact of these shifts, the 
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voting behavior and views of government that were produced, the criticism of 
immigration and globalization that coincided, and the announcement of who is to blame. 
Assessing these topics in existing literature may prove the validity of the statement that 
production shifts increase populism.  
4.2 Literature Review 
 
The existing literature emphasizes several structural factors when explaining the 
populist increases across the world in regards to production shifts. The increases are 
attributed to job losses due to technological advancement and the expansion of 
neoliberalism, criticizing government responses to financial crisis, consequences of 
economic insecurity, backlash to immigration, increased nationalism, altered voting 
behavior, the evolution of globalization skepticism, and highlight of the importance of 
China in this context. Review of the existing research can begin with neoliberalism where 
the origin of manufacturing and production shifts is discussed. 
AuthorsTejaswini Ganti and Jinhua Li examine the impact Neoliberalism has had 
on production shifts. Neoliberalism is defined as economic policies which emphasize 
deregulation of the economy, the liberalization of trade and industry, and the privatization 
of state-owned enterprises.135 The market liberalization and global economic integration 
associated with neoliberalism resulted in structural unemployment and the transfer of 
labor to sectors of the global economy.136 Neoliberalism, therefore, has had a diminishing 
effect on the manufacturing of democratic capitalist economies which produced social, 
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political, and economic consequences.137 These consequences combined with future 
technological advancement are fertile ground for the rise of populism. 
4.2.1 Technological Advancement and Industrialization 
 
Author Yotam Margalit expresses the opinion that a populist vote is a response to a 
combination of technological advances and deindustrialization. Technology has 
contributed to a shift from manufacturing to service sector jobs, and has deepened the 
gaps between low and high skilled occupations.138 Automation has contributed to a 
decline in demand for specific occupations. Companies changed though advancement in 
information and communication technology. The end result of such a combination 
allowed for some jobs to be dissolved completely.139 These changes were followed by 
growing geographic disparities in economic activity of certain communities and a 
depopulation of rural areas. Therefore, production shifts have produced a vulnerability of 
this US sector which is worsened by technological advancement. Yotam Margalit believes 
these technological changes further planted the seeds for populist forces.140 
Another claim is that financial crises and how governments respond to them can 
foster populism through their impact on citizens who have been bruised by production 
shifts. The Great Recession lead to widespread disappointment with mainstream parties 
who became seen as responsible for the crisis and its after math. This gave rise to a 
popular sentiment that the “little man” was made to pay for the mistakes and corruption 
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of the nation’s economic and political leadership.141Stanford researcher, Melissa de 
Witte, concludes that the Great Recession resulted in a wave of anti-establishment 
messages which fueled populist politics.142 The aftermath of the recession made the 
public question how in tune elected officials are with the concerns of average citizens. 
Financial crises would further cripple the people who were already receiving the negative 
impacts of neoliberalism and technological innovation. The extensive economic hardship 
experiences drove these citizens to other political alternatives. 
4.2.2 Government Responses to Crisis 
 
 Populism began growing momentum as it appeared to provide the solution to the 
economic shortcomings of officials. Populism would provide the answer as its prominent 
figures claim to have a genuine connection to the people. This link provides legitimacy in 
pursuing the people’s interest which can be served by a populist party or movement.143 
The 2008 economic crisis, therefore, ignited frustration with government and mainstream 
parties which allowed populism to crystallize. How people view institutions was altered 
and the loss of faith coincided with recession induced economic insecurity. 
4.2.3 Economic Insecurity 
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Economic insecurity developed during the Great Recession because of 
unemployment and underemployment.144 Howard Greenwald claims that this economic 
stress produced a politicization of citizens in both the left and the right.145 There was a 
backlash of specific groups that were experiencing associated economic uncertainty and 
they were looking for whom to blame for their suffering.  These manufacturing 
communities then directed their anger toward globalization policies. Citizens were driven 
to develop policy attitudes and voting behavior against this form of economic integration 
and to the political parties which advocated for it. The political attitudes associated to 
economic stress specifically impacted views regarding immigration.146 
4.2.4 Immigration 
 
Immigration is often cited as offering an explanation of rising populism. Criticism 
of immigration has a direct connection to production shifts and globalization. The claim 
is these shifts have fueled competition with foreign workers in certain sectors and labor 
market segments. Workers negatively impacted by the shifts have encountered economic 
insecurity and began to view these foreign workers as a threat to the jobs and wages of 
native workers.147 These concepts coupled with perceptions of fiscal costs associated to 
immigration as contributing additional economic strain to already limited public 
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services.148 Concerns regarding the welfare state produced xenophobia as a consequence 
and have increased the appeal of right-wing populists parties, particularly in areas with 
high settlement rates of immigration.149 
Issues involving immigration are unique in this context of their perceived costs. 
Author George J. Borjas suggests lacking evidence for concrete support regarding 
welfare effects and also claims that immigrants essentially will take unskilled jobs that 
natives often do not.150 However, it appears the perception of fiscal costs associated 
immigration does exist and fuels political arguments regardless of their 
legitimacy.151Criticism of immigration contributed to ideas of nationalism and nativism 
in the United States. Nationalism based on the perception of job competition and fiscal 
costs are often highly observed in production centered communities.152 
4.2.5 Nationalism 
 
The negative consequences of production shifts associated to the globalization 
effort were specifically visible in localities of production sites. These sites were 
important to the local community identities and they began closing down. Local labor 
markets with a high share of trade-exposed industries suffered from high rates of job loss, 
decreases in labor market participation, and an enduring rise in unemployment.153 The 
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losses of these manufacturing communities began fostering populist concepts of 
American nationalism.  
Authors Joseph Gerteis and Alyssa Goolsby emphasize that people were feeling 
that the markers of the American national identity was being attacked by a hostile alien 
threat. Traditional American ways of life and their livelihoods appeared to be at risk to 
these citizens.154The diminished manufacturing sector had historically been centric to the 
white working class population in the US.155The consequence was a mobilization of the 
“American” identity which influenced support for local political officials.156 
4.2.6 Voting Behavior 
 
The negative effects on these localities produced a political response by 
increasing support for populist candidates, parties, and causes. Congressional districts 
exposed to these manufacturing complications disproportionally removed moderate 
representatives and replaced them with more extreme candidates.157A sense of economic 
unfairness and lacking upward mobility was being sensed by the citizens who voted for 
these candidates. Populists prey on these voters by attributing inequity to elites or 
foreigners.158Attitudes of production shifts were then applied to globalization generally in 
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a negative manner by these groups.159 The grievances created what is known as 
globalization skepticism. 
4.2.7 Globalization Skepticism 
 
Globalization skepticism centers on the apparent win-lose scenario which global 
integration policies are argued to present. Roy C. Smith claims that production shifts 
have produced erosion of the well-being of the working and middle classes in the United 
States and Europe, where the conflict is being fueled by both the Left and Right. The 
globalized economic system may appear to have produced positive results for many but 
not for a significant number of American and European workers. These workers are 
claimed to be losing due to trade imbalances, inefficiencies, and corruption in the 
process.160 Who wins and who loses can be determined by where the industrialization and 
deindustrialization is occurring. 
Industrialized countries experience a deindustrialization through global 
integration. The manufacturing sector in developed countries is the most vulnerable to 
negative effects of globalization through production shifts.161  Deindustrialization 
weakens the bargaining position of labor. There is a transfer from higher wages in the 
industrial sector to lower wages in the service sector. There is also a rise in higher skilled 
workers income. What this process highlights is that some middle and lower class 
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workers experience losses in job availability and wages.162  Roy C. Smith advocates that 
production shifts, consequently, deteriorated the well being of the working and middle 
classes in both the United States and United Kingdom. 
Developing countries on the other side have observed industrialization through 
global integration. With this industrialization is a capital arrival and new jobs. There is an 
increase in wages for lower skilled worker’s incomes and coincides with a decrease in 
higher skilled workers incomes.163 The industrialized countries see an increase in 
inequality, while the developing country witnesses a decrease.164 This analysis of winners 
and losers allows one to bring China into the conversation. Many political scientists claim 
this nation as greatest winner in globalization terms. 
4.2.8 China’s Role 
 
Scholar Brian Nolan emphasized the importance of China and the outsourcing of 
production in his research. China’s entrance into the global trading system has opened up 
rich country manufacturing to intense competition from emerging economies with lower 
labor costs.  Capital became more flexible across borders and companies became more 
willing in their capacity to outsource and shift production to where costs are lower. 
Global supply chains could now be organized in such a manner that other jobs formerly 
embedded in the rich countries could be outsourced much more easily. Adverse effects on 
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both American and British industries which experienced higher exposure to Chinese 
competition were the results.165 
Review of the existing literature highlights the importance neoliberalism, 
technological advancement, financial crisis, economic insecurity, altered voting behavior, 
nationalism, immigration, globalization skepticism, and China have regarding production 
shifts. There is a clear connection of these topics and how they correlate to increased 
populism. However, many of the authors focus on just one aspect or two topics when 
answering the research question.  
A synthesis of the all information in the literature illuminates a chain reaction that 
produced the likelihood that support for populism would rise. Neoliberal and 
globalization policies weakened manufacturing of the United States and Britain through 
job loss. The communities in these nations were specifically vulnerable due to 
technological advancement and were comprised mainly of the lower and middle class 
who had previously dominated the manufacturing sector. Economic insecurity emerged 
which steered the voting behavior of these citizens. Recession exacerbated all of these 
problems and weakened the support of mainstream politicians. 
  The decreased support of mainstream politicians created increased support in 
populists. Populism evolved the notion that immigrants, globalization, and China were to 
blame for the economic hardship associated to production shifts. American and British 
nationalism then flourished. Constructing this chain of occurrence on how manufacturing 
production shifts produce populism allows readers to view the research from a more 
broad perspective.  
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The existing literature is also missing more specifically how the past decade 
differs from the ones before. The authors on this topic recognize the importance of 
financial crises and the Great Recession does serve as a trigger. However, it is not fully 
clear why there is still increasing populism even after the economy recovered. The United 
States and the United Kingdom are both experiencing populism. How can this be 
measured and compared to convey a more direct conclusion of the influence production 
shifts had? If neoliberal policies have weakened manufacturing, what are the actual 
numbers? How can the decaying trust of government be measured? Applying the 
knowledge from the existing literature to a data analysis of public opinion may provide 
more specific insight. Assessments of statistics and polling related to these topics may 
provide enlightening patterns, trends, and variables to provide answers to these questions. 
4.3 Data Analysis 
 
Financial crisis, economic insecurity, immigration, nationalism, altered voting 
behavior, and globalization skepticism discussed in the literature have provided wisdom 
on the study of production shifts and populism. This knowledge can be expanded upon by 
using a case study data analysis methodology using public opinion and statistics. Polling 
data of what citizens express as the most important issue facing the country, government 
approval measurements, and in changes in the number of manufacturing jobs can be used 
for analysis. Measurements of these areas will capture much of the ideas previously 
discussed and allow for further dissection. More clarity on how the last decade 





Applying this research to the United Kingdom in addition to the United States 
may also reveal consistency among nations showing increases in populism. Figures 4.1, 
4.2, and 4.3 provide polling data for the United Kingdom for case study one. Case study 













“Brexit: a  Solution in Search of a Problem.” By The Economist and Ipsos MORI.166 
 
4.3.2 Case Study One: The United States 
 
Figure 4.1 can begin case study one of the United Kingdom. The chart illuminates 
Ipsos MORI data of what citizens in Britain report as the most important issue facing the 
country today and ranges from 2006 to 2017. The graphic conveys that roughly 10% of 
respondents claimed European Union relations was most important prior to 2016. What 
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occurred later in 2016 was a substantial jump in importance to 40%. The number then 
jumped again 10 more points in 2017. Reviewing data in this manner will lead one to the 
significant year of 2016 and ask what changed? 2016 became a catalyst because it was 
the year of the United Kingdom European Union Membership Referendum. However, the 
polls do appear to begin slightly increasing in importance when compared from before to 
after the Great Recession. 
Figure 4.2. 
 








“A Contract Under Strain – Trust in Government & Politics”  
by Ipsos MORI and The European Values Survey.167 
 
The graphic represented by Figure 4.2 can continue case study one by covering 
polling data of British citizens regarding their confidence in government and ranges from 
1981 to 2018. The illustration reveals the numbers of people who trust the government 
dropped from 40% in 1986 to 22% in 2016. Confidence in the British Parliament also 
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declined from 41% in 1981 to 23% in 2010. These declines coincided with the number of 
reports insisting the government needed improvement increased from 18% in 2003 to 
37% in 2018. A small increase of confidence in Parliament during the 1980s is important 
to note. However, these polls do establish a general and significant pattern of declining 
support of government in Britain over decades.  If decline is also especially clear if one 
compares the decade before the Great Recession to after. 
Figure 4.3. 
 









Office of National Statistics of The United Kingdom.168 
 
Figure 4.3 can complete case study one by measuring The United Kingdom’s 
Office of National Statistics data of the number of manufacturing jobs in thousands 
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ranging from 1978 to 2020. The chart confirms a continued trend of decline of these jobs 
in the United Kingdom. After the Great Recession in 2008 the numbers appear to be 
relatively consistent. However, there is a substantial difference when 1978 and 2020 are 
compared. There is a similar situation if the decade before the Great Recession is 
compared to after. 
Figure 4.4. 
 









“New High in U.S. Say Immigration Most Important Problem” by Gallup.169 
 
4.3.3 Case Study Two: The United Kingdom 
 
Figure 4.4 on immigration can begin case study two with a focus on the United 
States. The chart reveals a Gallup poll ranging from 1993 to 2019 of the percentage of 
people who mention immigration as the most important problem occurring in the US. The 
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graphic illustrates how the question on immigration has increased from 3% in 1993 to 
23% in 2019. The mentions of immigration were at the highest it has ever been in 2019. 
There was the largest trend of increases after 2010. However, there was a substantial 
spike in these numbers around the years of the Great Recession.170 
Figure 4.5. 
 
Percentage of Americans Naming Government as the Most Important Problem Facing 
The US 







“Record High Name Government as Most Important Problem” by Gallup.171 
 
Figure 4.5 continues case study two. The graphic provides Gallup compiled 
polling of US citizens regarding the question: what is the most important problem facing 
America? The chart shows data ranging from 2001 to 2019. The current percentage of 
Americans naming government as the most important problem in December 2019 is 
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nearly twice as high as the 18% recorded in November. After remaining relatively 
constant from 2001, the Great Recession illustrates the event of where the trend of 
continued increases began to occur. 
Figure 4.6. 
 









“Factory Jobs are Again Shrinking in Industrial Midwestern States” by MarketWatch,  
Haver Analytics, and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.172 
 
Case study two can be completed by the final graph. Manufacturing jobs as a 
share of US employment are displayed by Figure 4.6. The shaded sections of the chart 
indicate a time period of economic recession. The figure reveals a significant drop in the 
number of manufacturing sector jobs since 1970. In nearly each time of recession there is 
a sharp decrease in these numbers. After the Great Recession these manufacturing jobs in 
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the US were at their lowest and remained consistently low. However, it is important to 
remember that technological advancement would play a role in these reports. 
Manufacturing job levels and government trust in the United Kingdom and the 
United States are at their lowest reported points in decades after analyzing the case 
studies. Issues of immigration and international partnerships are also at their highest 
levels of importance. The past decade is where the major shifts in the polling data and 
statistics began. Therefore, the importance of the Great Recession in accordance to these 
measurements is highlighted. Visibility to a pattern of decline in manufacturing since the 
1970s is gained through the case studies. The decline in manufacturing has a correlation 
to the decline in government approval and to the rise of the importance of immigration 
and international union membership issues. More specific conclusions on manufacturing 
and populism can now be reached by applying these case study revelations to the 
information gained from the literature review.  
4.4 Conclusion 
 
Review of the existing literature and combining it with a case study data analysis 
reveal the answer to the research question of: how have manufacturing production shifts 
influenced populism in the last decade? The information and data suggest the answer is 
production shifts increase populism through their role in increasing economic insecurity, 
altering voting behavior, decreasing trust in government, increasing the importance of 
immigration policy, and increasing criticism of globalization. The further contribution of 
the research conducted to reach this conclusion is how they are connected and how they 





The case studies reveal a decline in manufacturing since the 1970s. This decline 
coincided with decreased faith in government and rises of importance in immigration and 
international partnerships after the Great Recession. This polling suggests a connection of 
current populism to decades old policies that began this trend.173 Review of the existing 
literature indicated that the 1970s sparked the spread of neoliberalism and free trade. 
Therefore, there is a connection of current populism to historic neoliberalism policies 
which appeared to have been exacerbated by the Great Recession and globalization. New 
and old components are revealed to comprise the rise in current populism. However, 
many do suggest there are additional non-economic factors associated to this increase. 
4.4.2 Racial Inequality Counter Argument 
 
One factor that many argue is a driving force in modern populism is the social 
complications of racial inequality. The problems regarding equality from before and after 
the 2016 Referendum in which Britain voted to leave The European union raised political 
concerns around race and immigration.174 These concerns remain as dominant features of 
the current political environment in Britain through a suggested increase associated to the 
acceptability of racial and ethnic intolerance.175These issues are claimed to have a role in 
                                                            
173 Bruno, Tinel. “The Crisis of Neoliberalism” World Review of Political Economy 2(1)(2011): 118. 
174 William Shankley, and James Rhodes. "Racisms in Contemporary Britain." In Ethnicity and Race in the 
UK: State of the Nation, ed by Shankley William, Byrne Bridget, Alexander Claire, Khan Omar, and Nazro 
James. (Bristol, UK; Chicago, IL, USA: Bristol University Press) 223. 
175.William Shankley, and James Rhodes. "Racisms in Contemporary Britain." 226. 
94 
 
racism shaping dynamics of populism through the structural migration system and border 
policies in Europe.176 
Racism in Europe can also be interpreted in a different manner as a counter 
reaction to a series of political defeats. Author Georgi Fabian claims that racist ideologies 
can emerge to justify practices of oppression which have a social or economic benefit for 
privileged groups.177 From a historical perspective, Fabian argues that migration can be 
understood as a political project where neoliberal actors attempted to push migration and 
refugee policy under the imperatives of competiveness and economic 
growth.178Migration would be positive in this interpretation and serve as economically 
beneficial to the dominant forces of the immigration countries.  
What occurred as a response to these practices was instead the growth of 
resistance against neoliberal strategies by large segments of the European population. 
Resistance was motivated by a mix of nationalism, welfare patriotism, and racism.179 
Ultimately, social issues involving race and inequality clearly do appear to influence 
populism. However, it is important to note that neoliberal and globalization initiatives 
from an economic perspective were also among the important components in the 
evolution of this racism. 
The components which formulated modern populism had influential political 
consequences. Clarity on who are the winners and who are the losers emerged along with 
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inflammatory narratives. In the US context, China can be seen as having the upper hand. 
In the United Kingdom, it is the other countries of the European Union in addition to 
China.180This concept is represented through Britain’s referendum vote to leave the 
European Union and the election of Donald Trump with his “America first” approach to 
foreign policy. The public opinion data and statistics, therefore, present a pattern and 
chain reaction which is not easily visible through sole review of the literature. This chain 
is what caused increases or decreases in the polling topics that represent growing 
populism. 
The increases and decreases associated to the answer of this research question are 
significant to the conversation of populism by the connections of what they illustrate in a 
larger context. The importance of manufacturing and the associated vulnerability of this 
sector are revealed. The longstanding influence associated to the policies of previous 
decades is explained. The enduring impact of the Great Recession is exemplified. How 
regional and local community shifts can have international and global consequences is 
shown. The winners and losers of globalization are highlighted. An illustration of the 
patterns of which can be gathered by public opinion measurements and statistics is 
provided. Finally, a trend of similar modern political challenges among democratic 
capitalistic nations is illuminated through this discussion of populism. These conclusions 
provide support for the statement that manufacturing production shifts increase populism. 
Shifts in these critical sectors of the United States and the United Kingdom produce 
populism through globalization. 
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This thesis has highlighted the importance of the relationship economies have to 
democracy. Recession, neoliberalism, and globalization have undermined satisfaction of 
democratic governing systems around the globe. These crises, economic policies, and 
international market integration efforts have acted in concert to produce domestically 
destabilizing consequences for the economies of developed nations. Destabilizing these 
economies served to spark the increases of modern political polarization and populism. 
The data which was presented in these three chapters provided evidence 
supporting claims suggesting that economic instability coincides with political instability. 
Political instability was illustrated by increases in partisan division, increases in support 
for anti establishment movements, decreases in public opinion of government, and 
decreases in the effectiveness of democratic institutions. Final closure to this study can 
now be achieved by further summarizing the findings of each chapter, explaining one last 
concept regarding the importance of the middle class, addressing limitations, indicating 
additional areas of research, and suggesting policy solutions. 
5.2 Summaries 
 
5.2.1 Chapter One 
 
Chapter one examined the influence economic recession has on political 
polarization. The chapter provided evidence to support the statement that recession 
increases political polarization and serves to decrease trust in government, produce policy 
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gridlock in Congress, and weaken democracy. Literature on this topic indicated that 
polarization was increased because recession increases partisan identification, increases 
unemployment and income inequality, produces an economic fragmentation of citizens 
based on impact, increases hostility through blame, drives the political parties to 
radicalize, and decreases moderate voters.  
Chapter one further confirmed recession increased political polarization by 
providing a data analysis case study comparison of partisanship during the recessions of 
1973, 1980, and 2008. These studies revealed short term spikes in public opinion polls of 
strong partisanship during the previous recessions. The case of the Great Recession in 
2008 differed because it indicated that a trend was forming in its aftermath instead of a 
short lived increase. Evaluation of this poll information confirmed that extreme partisan 
identification will increase during times of recession. This analysis was then connected to 
an assessment of income and unemployment which the literature review identified as 
important variables for producing extreme partisan identifications. 
Charts illustrating statistical measurements of income and unemployment based 
on race during the timeframe of each case study were presented in this chapter. The 
graphics indicated increases in unemployment and decreases in income for all races 
during times of economic crisis. However, these images also highlighted the existing 
inequality associated to income for minorities. This inequality present in the charts was 
also illuminated to have continually increased over a long period of time. 
The findings of chapter one concluded that inequality has continued to worsen 
over several decades. Each recession served to aggravate a higher instance of inequality 
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than the last. Impact disparities based on occupation, class, age, race, and gender would 
also be more influential in each sequential recession. The 2008 financial crisis 
exacerbated these long-standing patterns and served as the catalyst in producing the level 
of political polarization observed in America today. Chapter one confirmed how 
recession influenced this modern polarization by increasing previous inequality. 
The discussion of recession and polarization in this section can then lead one’s 
attention to investigate the specific economic policies which may have formulated these 
patterns of continued inequality. Neoliberalism can be identified as it has comprised the 
American capitalistic market consensus historically.181 An investigation of neoliberalism 
in a nation other than United States can uncover information which will apply in a 
broader scope to the conversation of why satisfaction of democracy has declined 
globally. 
5.2.2 Chapter Two 
 
Chapter two illuminated the consequences of neoliberal economic policies 
through its examination of how realignment of the Labour Party influenced public 
opinion in the United Kingdom after the Great Recession. Realignment of the Labor 
Party in 1997 served as a significant political point in time for Britain. The party’s shift 
toward neoliberalism solidified the prominence of these economic policies in its society. 
Labor market deregulation, privatizing state owned-enterprises, product market 
deregulation, financial market liberalization, and free trade were furthered. Public 
opinion polling data revealed decreases in satisfaction of government, decreases in 
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economic satisfaction, and increasing support in the concepts of “Euroskepticism” after 
the recession in 2008. This decline of public opinion coincided with decreases in 
traditional party support and increases in support of populist movements. 
Chapter two’s study of declines in public opinion and the rise of populism in 
Britain is significant in what it uncovers. The influence political party alterations can 
have was revealed. The power of market pressures to steer policy was displayed. The 
consequences of diminishing the community which is represented by labor were also 
presented. The connection these topics have explain how populism and nationalism have 
increased. Populism and nationalism are reflected through The United Kingdom’s 
Referendum to leave the European Union. Therefore, neoliberalism has an association to 
globalization through this monetary partnership. A component of neoliberalism and 
globalization involves free trade and an outsourcing of manufacturing. One can then 
study the correlation that these production shifts have to populism. 
5.2.3 Chapter Three 
 
Chapter three in this thesis discussed how globalization meshed with neoliberal 
policies in the United States and Britain which shifted manufacturing externally to other 
countries. Domestic manufacturing as a sector of the economy in these nations has been 
declining over the past 30 years as a consequence. Losses in manufacturing caused public 
opinion of government to decrease and the importance of immigration and remaining in 
regional economic union memberships to increase. 
Chapter three emphasizes the vulnerability and importance of local manufacturing 
in a broader global context. Examples of how policies reaching back decades evolved this 
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vulnerability were provided. Clarity on a competitive and inflammatory aspect of 
globalization was shown through identification of who benefits and who does not. 
Similar to chapter one and two, what can be acquired through public opinion 
measurements in a quantitative manner is shown. These public opinion measurements 
ultimately led to evidence which supports the statement that production shifts increase 
populism. The discussion of populism in this chapter further indicated a commonality of 
challenges present in democratic capitalistic nations around the globe. 
5.3 The Middle Class 
 
One final addition chapter three provided was a visible similarity it had with 
chapters one and two. All chapters include a discussion of class and more specifically the 
middle class in some capacity. Thusly, when compiling the information from these 
chapters it is meaningful to emphasize again the importance of the middle class. Chapter 
three suggested manufacturing was dominated by the middle class in the United States 
and the fall of this economic sector was influential in populism. This same increase in 
populism was discussed in chapter two with the concept of a population represented by 
labor being neglected through party realignment. Chapter one also revealed a specific 
vulnerability of the middle class to the economic insecurity caused by recession. It would 
then be appropriate to further explain the significance of these events have by explaining 
why the middle class is important to democracy.  
Middle classes are more likely to demand democracy and redistribution when 
they become insecure about keeping their socio-economic status under autocracy. In 
contrast, they are more likely to support an authoritarian alternative when they feel 
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vulnerable under democracy.182 The size and relative income of the middle class also 
matters for democratic transition and consolidation. If the middle class is prosperous and 
large enough to prove influential under democracy, redistributive costs of democracy 
decrease for the elite and democratization is more likely. Therefore, the likelihood of 
successful democratization efforts or the maintaining of existing democracy for the 
middle class is connected to the level of inequality in the society it operates within.183 
The middle class lacks the political power to protect its interests in the same 
manner of the higher class. It is vulnerable to politics through its reliance on democratic 
institutions by popular election of a leader, the limitation of state power, and the 
constitutional protection of individual rights. Without a large middle class, society 
becomes unequal in the distribution of socio-economic resources. 184Extreme inequalities 
will generate resentment and frustrations among the disadvantaged group. Resentments 
and frustrations will weaken allegiance to the regime. Consequently, socio-economic 
inequality has a negative effect on democracy. It reduces the likelihood that democracy 
will be installed in countries under authoritarian regime or it reduces the existing 
democracy in ones which comprise it.185 
Author Chun Long Lu expresses the opinion that societies which have a 
dominating middle class are suggested to have lower inequality. The most important 
socio-economic inequalities present will be based on education, occupation, and 
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individual achievement and not on inherited social position. A middle dominant society 
would then coincide with higher social mobility. Middle class societies which emphasize 
social mobility will create stronger environments for liberal democracy to flourish than 
those guided by class barriers.186 Therefore, available literature does suggest that stifling 
the middle class would stifle democracy. This concept can be further illustrated by 
explaining the connection international trade, manufacturing workers, and the middle 
class have. 
Workers at plants and companies which were shut down due to import expansion 
and regions which have a related sector specialization faced particularly strong 
adjustment costs, job displacement, and reduced earnings due to globalization.187 The 
groups who were defeated by globalization were mainly comprised of citizens within the 
middle class. The interests of these sectors of industry which were negatively affected by 
trade evolved policy demands.188 These demands called for compensation and 
protectionism. What these petitions indicate is a connection of international trade, 
nationalism, manufacturing, policy, and economics.189Democracy would then be affected 
in the context of this research.  
The importance of the experience these middle class localities have in regards to 
globalization and democracy is clear. Though, one may question if a discussion of 
specific manufacturing communities within this class in the United States or Britain are 
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limited in scope to the larger context of globalization and populism. Addressing this 
narrowness may resolve related questions regarding possible limitations to this thesis. 
5.4 Limitations 
 
Critics may suggest one limitation of this research is its dominant focus on the 
United States and Britain. These critics could suggest there is something specific to these 
two powerful capitalistic nations regarding populism and political polarization which 
may restrict the applicability of the research. However, examples were provided of 
numerous other nations experiencing these problems. Examining one of these instances 
outside of America and the United Kingdom can address these claims and prove the 
further applicability of this research. The welfare state in the Nordic countries which 
comprises “Nordic Exceptionalism” can serve as an example of the broader scope this 
thesis has. 
5.4.1 Nordic Exceptionalism 
 
The economies of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden have high per capita 
incomes, are highly rated in international competitiveness, and have strong health and 
education standards.190 However, these four Nordic nations also share an economic 
vulnerability in their manufacturing sectors.191 Manufacturing is in a decline for these 
economies which has historically been a critical driver of economic growth, employment, 
and strong trade balances for the region. There is expected to be economic and social 
                                                            
190 Andreas Alsen, Ian Colotla, Martin Daniels, Borge Kristoffersen, and Pekka Vanne. “Revitalizing 
Nordic Manufacturing, Why Decisive Action is Needed Now.” The Boston Consulting Group (2013) 3. 
191 Alsen, Colotla, Daniels, Kristoffersen, and Vanne. “Revitalizing Nordic Manufacturing, Why Decisive 
Action is Needed Now.” 3. 
104 
 
impacts in the region if the decline continues.192The concern over manufacturing will 
likely increase because citizens in the Nordic nations have began to perceive their prized 
welfare state at risk through international integration with Europe. 
Welfare is part of social citizenship rights in the Nordic countries. The role of the 
state in providing basic coverage and entitlement programs is central to these rights.  This 
system is characterized by comprehensive social principles which served to generate a 
sense of pride and national identity for the Nordics known as “Nordic 
Exceptionalism.”193 This exquisitely viewed welfare state was disturbed by external 
ideological and economic policies through internationalization with Europe.194 
Integrative policies with Europe conflicted with the Nordic emphasis on and 
internal control of redistributive policies. The consequence was a rise in support for the 
Progress Party in Norway and the Danish People’s Party in Denmark with their openly 
anti-immigration attitudes.195 These populist parties are, indeed, advocates of their 
welfare states due to rises in immigration and the opening of borders.196 
The Swedish welfare state may be adapting to new challenges presented by 
globalization but it is unlikely to be destroyed. As discussed in chapter three, the threats 
to the welfare system may not be fully legitimate. However, regardless of the reality and 
magnitude of these threats in the Nordic countries, there is a political populist response 
represented by welfare state nationalism. It appears there are similarities of this perceived 
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threat associated to European integration to those in the United Kingdom. The existence 
of these similarities can lead one to then examine possible instances where this threat is 
not associated to union membership. Ireland, Portugal, and Malta can serve as examples 
of positive views connected to European integration. 
5.4.2 Ireland, Portugal, and Malta 
 
Ireland, Portugal, and Malta are important to note in this research as they have 
benefited from globalization. These countries have favorable views of the European 
Union and do not have strong measured support for populist parties.197 Over 90% of 
polling respondents have favorable views of union membership. It is also noted that these 
countries have high ratings of general happiness and well being. However, Author Paul 
Hockenos suggests understanding the political stability and national politics of these 
countries requires examining each one individually.198 There may be specific conditions 
and historical circumstances that have allowed them to succeed and will be difficult to 
replicate elsewhere.199 These challenges would also represent a possible limitation to this 
thesis from the perspective of lacking non-economic factors. 
5.4.2 Non-Economic Factors 
 
One could claim that a thesis which emphasized the importance the economy has 
to democracy could be limited by lacking the inclusion of non-economic factors. 
However,chapter one acknowledged the importance of ideology involving how the 
                                                            
197 Paul Hockenos, “Is There a Secret Recipe for Preventing Far-Right Populism?” Foreign Policy, last 
Modified May 9, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/09/is-there-a-secret-recipe-for-
preventing-far-right-populism/ 




legitimacy of opponents is interpreted in regards to political polarization. The chapter 
also explained that ideological voters would not likely change their partisan identification 
during a recession. Political parties have an inability to fully shape or change citizen’s 
perceptions according to authors James Adams, Lawrence Ezrow, and Zeynep Somer-
Topcu.200 It can, consequently, be suggested that ideology is a pre-existing condition 
which is aggravated by recession. Radicalization of the parties in an adversarial manner 
during crisis can lead citizens to feel as though they are not properly represented which 
increases distrust in government. 
 Chapter two further explained that issues relating to pre-existing conditions in 
connection with populists only gained momentum and support mainly because of current 
economic hardship. Chapter three acknowledged that social issues such as racism were an 
important component to these populist moments. The economic component, though, was 
explained to have also heavily contributed in the formation of this racism. In a final 
attempt to address another non-economic factor in this context, this conclusion can 
discuss the impact culture has to populism. 
5.4.4 Culture 
 
The scope of this research in relation to democracy and the economy would 
suggest economic origins sparked controversy regarding immigration. The examined 
public opinion evidence in this thesis does support the concept that immigration issues tie 
to economic insecurity.201  However, it is important to note that other political scientists 
suggest that a sense of cultural threat is at the core of opposition to immigration instead. 
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From this perspective, opposition to immigration represents a broader concern many 
natives have about declining cultural homogeneity.202 Therefore, further research 
focusing on how cultural homogeneity influences democracy may provide arguments 
against the importance of the economy. 
To address these possible claims it is essential to again emphasize that the 
democratic decline is occurring globally in capitalistic nations. Combining research in a 
comparative manner would be needed for broad conclusions to be made. This thesis 
incorporates case studies in multiple nations and timeframes while acknowledging the 
importance of ideology, pre-existing conditions, race, and culture have. Research 
focusing on the role culture has in the formation of current populism and polarization 
instead would need to conversely acknowledge the economic component as well to 
prevent the research from being contextual. In addition, specific conditions and historical 
circumstances would have to be incorporated and replicated in an individual basis as 
scholar Paul Hockenos suggested using Ireland, Portugal, and Malta as examples. It 
would, therefore, be difficult to disprove the important role economies have in the 
modern decline of democracy. Indeed, public opinion regarding importance of 
immigration jumped catastrophically after the Great Recession as indicated by chapter 
three. The question could then be raised if the importance of immigration would have 
remained the same if economic crisis did not occur? Therefore, culture may have had an 
important impact but it would also have a correlation to the economic aspect through 
recession. 
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There are no doubt other social and non-economic factors contributing to the 
decline of democracy and the rise of political polarization and populism. However, there 
are critics of contributions regarding economic literature which attribute the economy to a 
secondary role of “contextual factors.”203 Scholars Italo Colantone and Piero Stanig 
suggest there is evidence of radical voting through economic conditions which stem from 
job insecurity. They also suggest that economic distress can lead to authoritarianism, 
ethnocentrism, and anti-minority sentiments.204 Thusly, the presented data, the patterns, 
the trends, and the literature pointing to economics are valid. Further defense against non-
economic factors in regards to the decline of democracy can be presented by a 
Congressional Research Service report on the textile industry in 1991. 
5.4.5 The Textile Industry 
 
Political leaders understood that opening borders to foreign competition would 
lead to job displacement under the assumption that these workers would be re-absorbed 
into employment in more competitive sectors.205 The Congressional Research Service 
provided a study of the textile sector and confirmed that hundreds of thousands of jobs 
were lost due to Chinese imports. From 1979 to 1989, employment in apparel 
manufacturing went down 16% and employment in textile manufacturing went down 
18%. Additionally, The Committee on Finance estimated that in a three year period 
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lasting from 1980 to 1983, the dramatic increase in imports of textiles resulted in a loss of 
an estimated 180,000 American job opportunities.206 
Critics of viewing these numbers on face value only argue that job loss could be 
explained through productivity innovation instead of solely Chinese imports. 
Additionally, many critics explain further that many of the lost jobs were concentrated 
within North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. These states which had 
unemployment rates due to the loss in the apparel industry invested in other industries to 
compensate. The argument is that there was a visible loss but the loss did not foster as 
large of an economic impact when studied more closely.207 
The Congressional Research Service report was written in 1991 and appears to 
have been unable to withstand the test of time. The decline in manufacturing and the job 
loss did continue and proved to connect to future economic and political consequences. 
The adaptability of the three indicated states to transfer workers to other industries may 
have been a situational outlier at that time. 
It can also be claimed that the report illustrates how concepts of nationalism 
instead of culture do have a strong economic component. Nationalism may not have risen 
if the decline in manufacturing was not so extensive and the capability of industry and 
sector transfer was still widespread.  When there were no opportunities of transfer 
available was when economic and employment insecurity emerged. Thusly, it can be 
claimed from this perspective that the economic component may have been more critical 
than the cultural one. The report offered by the Congressional Research service expressed 
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the opinion that people would simply get different jobs. One could argue this suggestion 
would indicate that citizen’s employment with textiles or manufacturing was not tethered 
to their identity. It was when broader unemployment came into the picture is when the 
problems appeared. Nationalism likely was ignited in this manner through the resulting 
blame of China for the employment losses. 
5.5 Additional Areas of Research 
5.5.1 Technology 
 
However, it ultimately it should be acknowledged that, social, cultural, and other 
non-economic factors are contributing heavily to the dissatisfaction of democracy in 
some manner. As discussed in chapter three, there are arguments that technology further 
exacerbated the employment losses associated to globalization. Examining the influence 
technology has on democracy in another thesis may provide further evidence to support 
why economic stability is critical to democracy or allow further counter arguments to 
emerge. 
The existence of possible additional factors and counter arguments do not 
disprove the validity of this thesis. The information, literature, and data gathered in this 
study are not country specific which provides evidence that economic stability is 
connected to political stability. The chapters in this research illustrate how 
unemployment, income inequality, production shifts, and internationalization served to be 
economically destabilizing in at least some capacity. Populism and political polarization 
are the results and act as articulations of political instability. Democracy is then 
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influenced by this political instability which exemplifies the relationship the economy has 
to democracy. 
The existing literature combined with data analysis of public opinion illustrate the 
connection that views of well being have to employment availability, income, and 
upward mobility. These components mesh the stability of well being to economic 
stability. When these components are threatened through neoliberal policies, 
globalization initiatives, and financial crisis is when the problems begin to arise and 
global political complications are produced.  These global complications reach downward 
and back to a citizen’s employment availability and wages which establishes how the 
economy is related to democracy. 
Research on the relationship the economy has to democracy and its important role 
in sustaining democracy has allowed for many conclusions to be reached. The value of 
domestic industry is illuminated. The necessity of the middle class is highlighted. Clarity 
on the dangers associated to inequality based on gender, race, and age is provided. The 
consequences of declined public opinion of government are uncovered. The problems 
associated to a nation’s loss of economic sovereignty are revealed. The extensive 
capabilities that political parties have are affirmed. Why wages and jobs matter is 
confirmed. The importance of manufacturing is exemplified. Clarity on the true influence 
political parties have is given. The force market pressures can exude is demonstrated. 
Lastly, the dangers associated to a destabilized economy are illustrated. These revelations 
can lead to suggestions to be made to remedy some of challenges which globalization, 





5.6 Policy Solutions 
 
The research conducted in this thesis has displayed how certain groups and 
industries were distressed more significantly than others by market oriented policies, 
internationalization, and financial crisis. Ramifications were produced due to this unequal 
impact. Displacing workers of a demographic or community at a local level can have 
consequences which reach the national and international level. Therefore, assistance 
efforts to curb the displacement may prove to be stabilizing. Stabilizing suggestions can 
include: indicating possible benefits of investigating or investing in policies which 
produce economic autonomy, improved trade agreements to curb the costs of production 
shifts, and compensation programs for workers or industries decimated by trade shocks. 
5.6.1 Economic Autonomy 
 
There may be benefits attached to policies which promote economic autonomy for 
democratic nations. Such efforts may increase the economic recovery time associated to 
future recessions. For example, the recovery in the aftermath Great Recession was 
acknowledged to be and forecasted as slow. 208Authors Kathryn Dominguez and Matthew 
Shapiro claim the slow recovery had a connection to financial discord in Europe in 2010. 
They suggest that unresolved external financial issues acted to stunt the United States 
recovery over a period of several years. These scholars express the opinion that the pace 
of economic growth after the financial crisis did have a distinct association to 
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international partnerships. The recovery for the United States was strangled due to 
continued joint financial and fiscal crises in Europe.209 
The length of time for recovery is important in a political sense. The problems in 
Europe seem to have expanded domestic concerns about the ability of American policy 
makers to resolve financial problems.210 Questioning the abilities of policy makers would 
have clear consequences regarding trust and support of government. As previously 
discussed, these views cause concerns for the favorability of democracy. There then may 
be merit to investigating policies which instill more economic autonomy in these nations. 
One way to initiate this endeavor is to re-evaluate international trade agreements. 
Autonomy in this sense can be geared toward improved and stabilizing policies as 
opposed to a jarring international decoupling. One recent example of this type of initiate 
is argued to be pronounced in the United States Mexico Canada Agreement. 
5.6.2 USMCA Agreement 
 
The United States Mexico Canada Agreement includes exceptions for the auto 
industry and requires 75% of an automobiles content to be from member nations of the 
partnership to avoid tariffs. 211Additionally, a requirement of 40% to 50% of the regional 
content to be produced by workers earning a minimum of 16 dollars per hour is to be 
introduced. These numbers would be an increase from North American Free Trade 
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152. 
210 Ibid, 153. 
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Agreement with a goal of boosting manufacturing and creating jobs over time.212 The 
concept centers on the idea of stabilizing the manufacturing sector. Critics of the new 
agreement question the ability of it to fully produce more jobs. While the recent 
agreement solidifies to assess if it was successful or unsuccessful, another way to curb 
the costs attributed to losses in the manufacturing sector is expanding compensational 
programs. 
5.6.3 Compensation Programs 
 
Expanding and improving compensation programs for displaced workers may 
help remedy the effects of a declined industry. There were efforts made for this goal by 
establishing trade adjustment assistance through The Worker Adjustment and Retraining 
Notification Act. Unfortunately, these programs have their critics as they appear to not 
have been able to make a substantial positive impact.213 Scholar Lori G. Kletzer claimed 
these programs were ineffective in providing adequate assistance to workers. The 
monetary compensation was low, the duration the benefits lasted was short, and the scope 
of the program’s applicability was limited to a regional and state basis.214 
If the cost to the manufacturing sector was so severe as discussed in chapter three, 
there would be a valid argument in favor of allocating additional government resources to 
these initiatives. Expanding the scope, raising the compensation, and extended how long 
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213Lori G. Kletzer “Trade and Labor Market Adjustment: The Costs of Trade-Related Job Loss in the 
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these programs last may serve to reinvigorate these assistance programs. Additional 
resources may make the programs transform from a passive role to a more active one to 
improve their effectiveness and success.215 
5.7. Final Discussion 
 
The use of assistance programs may prove to provide stabilization for some 
important aspects of the economy which have been weakened by recession, 
neoliberalism, and globalization. The evidence compiled in this research suggests that 
initiatives such as these may assist in the recovery of democracy. Income and 
employment fragmentation can be weakened, economic satisfaction can improve, the 
political parties can de-radicalize, nationalism can soften, and populism can decay. 
Democratic institutions can then regain their efficiency and effectiveness. Trust in 
government can then be restored to revive faith in democracy.  
There is likely a long road ahead and assistance programs may be substantially 
small steps. If these were combined with improved trade agreements and initiatives 
which comprise additional autonomy for democratic nations, a more influential path may 
be set. If so, these policy suggestions would serve as further evidence examined in this 
thesis and provide support for the statement that economic stability is critical to 
democracy. Without it, democratic satisfaction may continue to decline, autocracy could 
extend its reach on a global scale, and nations may further ripen for tyranny.216 
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